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In ,**. I visited an exhibit at the National Archives in Tokyo
dedicated to the +/* th anniversary of the opening of Japanese
ports in +2/.. I expected that the exhibit would begin with the
American and Russian naval expeditions to Japan led,
respectively, by Commodore Perry and Admiral Putiatin in +2/-.
However, to my surprise, it began with the much earlier, and
lesser-known Russian embassy to Japan of +2*.*/ headed by
Chamberlain Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov. This was the first official
Russian embassy to Japan, and as is well-known, its members
were kept waiting in Nagasaki for several months before being
completely rebuffed in their commercial and diplomatic aims by
the shogunate in Edo. If it had so failed in its main purposes, I
wondered why the organizers of the exhibit considered it
important enough to be included in it. Moreover, why was
approximately equal space devoted to it as to that of the Perry
expedition?
In this article I will reconsider and reevaluate the historical
significance of this embassy in the light of recent scholarship and

one newly-available original account, in order to determine if the
archival view of it is justified. It is hoped that the recently
published diary + of ambassador Rezanov, together with a close
reading of the other major foreign original sources dealing with
this mission, as well as a few original Japanese sources will shed a
critical light upon the deeper cultural, political and economic
currents flowing beneath the surface, which too narrow a focus
on its superfical diplomatic failure may cause one to overlook. It
was these very currents that brought the embassy to Japan.
The personal journal of ambassador Rezanov is of considerable
historical value, not only for the light it sheds on the reasons for
the failure of the embassy, but also in how it illumines the ways
in which it may be justifiably be said to have succeeded, or at
least, to have laid the basis for the success of later embassies.
Nevertheless, those sections of it which concern the lengthy stay
of the Russian embassy in Nagasaki were subjected first to
Tsarist and then to Soviet censorship, and not published in Russia
until comparatively recently +33/. , A Japanese translation
appeared shortly thereafter ,***, but no translation has yet
been published in English. Accordingly, I have translated
extensive extracts from the Russian original for this article.
The other major foreign accounts of this embassy, written by
two of its participants, Lt. Commander Ivan Fyodorovich Adam
Johan Krusenstern and the German natural scientist and
physician Georg H. Von Langsdorff were both translated into
English and published in London in +2+- and +2+1, respectively.-
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Both were widely read and exerted a major influence on the
image of Japan by the English-speaking world over the next few
decades until the American and Russian naval expeditions of +2/-
and +2/.. These accounts, and that of Krusenstern in particular,
would be instrumental in forging a more impatient and even
indignant ethnocentric approach to the question of opening Japan
to Western commerce and diplomacy. Langsdorff’s narrative was
written more from the viewpoint of what we would recognize
today as ‘cultural relativity’ than that of Krusenstern. The latter’s
account was clearly a forerunner of the militant, uncompromising
and intolerant approach adopted by Commodore Perry some five
decades later. The fourth major foreign account of this embassy is
that of Hendrik Doeff, the resident superintendent of the Dutch
‘factory’ on the island of Dejima in Nagasaki during the entire
stay of the Russian embassy there. Although those of a fellow
European, his recollections offer a different perspective on, and
serve as a sharp contrast in some key aspects to the better-known
accounts of Langsdorff and Krusenstern.
A Brief Review of Previous Scholarship
One might say that this first official Russian embassy to Japan
has a long history of being described inaccurately or interpreted
with prejudice, based on biased sources and unfounded rumors.
This tendency began with Krusentern himself, whose personal
animosity and lack of respect toward Rezanov, and
misunderstanding of Japanese customs and political conditions,

has unfortunately influenced many later writers.
Vasily Golovnin, who suffered a two-year captivity in Japan, as
a direct result of the attacks on Japanese settlements on Sahalin
and the Kurils, which Rezanov had ordered two officers of the
Russian-American company to carry out, also did not have a high
opinion of Rezanov’s character. He thought that he had had no
cause to complain about the treatment that he had received at the
hands of the Japanese, except for their refusal to allow him
freedom of movement and to engage in trade.
The German physician P. F. Von Siebold, resident on Dejima
from +2,-,3, thought that the failure of the Rezanov embassy
was owing to his unfamiliarity with Japanese customs, etiquette
and language. However, Siebold must not have read Rezanov’s
diary, for if he had, it is difficult to imagine that he could have
made such claims..
In the introduction to the official Narrative of an American
Squadron to the China Seas and Japan..., the official account of
the American naval expedition led by Commodore M. C. Perry,
and published after his return to the United States in +2/0,
Francis Hawks provided a rather garbled, capsule account of the
Rezanov embassy. He did not mention which original account of
the mission his own is based on, but it seems to derive largely
from that of Krusenstern, and is unfairly critical of the conduct of
the envoy Rezanov. For example, he claimed that “Rezanov had
hardly arrived, however, before he furnished abundant evidence
of his unfitness for the delicate mission with which he was
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intrusted sic He commenced his intercourse with the Japanese
officials by a dispute on a ridiculous point of etiquette, viz :
whether he should make a bow to the Emperor’s representatives.
Next, he positively refused to surrender the arms of the ship,
according to the usual custom, though it was perfectly useless to
retain them, as he had given up all the ammunition to the
Japanese. He then very foolishly contrived to convince the
inmates of the Dutch factory at Dezima sic, to whom he
brought letters, that he suspected them of secretly intriguing to
defeat his purposes with the Japanese ; while, in point of fact, the
sagacious Dutchman, Doeff, who had charge of Dezima, was
exercising all his ingenuity to pursue such a nicely balanced
system of non-commital..., and to turn events to the advantage of
himself and his countrymen.”/
As I hope to show later in this article, whether Rezanov was, in
fact, unsuited for his ‘delicate mission’ begs the question of
whether any official envoy of the Russian empire could have
been. Krusenstern was highly critical of Rezanov’s conduct of the
mission, but it is very unlikely that he would have made a more
suitable envoy. Moreover, it is extremely ingenuous for Hawks to
fault Rezanov for insisting on ‘a ridiculous point of etiquette’
when Commodore Perry made a determined insistence on similar
points of etiquette a cornerstone of his policy toward the
Japanese, and even ascribed his success thereto. As for the alleged
intrigues of Doeff against the Russian embassy, he seems to be
merely dressing the unclad and unsubstantiated rumors of the

day in the guise of historical fact.
The Russian historian Voensky +23/, writing some forty
years after Perry and Putiatin had first set an example, suggested
that if Rezanov had come at the head of a strong naval squadron,
he might have succeeded in opening Japanese ports fifty years
earlier.0
Turning to the Japanese viewpoint, a high appraisal of the
historical significance of the Rezanov embassy may be found in
the English version of a history of the fifty years since the
opening of Japanese ports, Fifty Years of New Japan +3+*
compiled by Count Okuma Shigenobu. At the beginning of one of
the chapters of this book, Okuma pondered the historical
significance of the Rezanov embassy :
“It is now nearly a hundred years since a Russian envoy set foot
in this country, and with his arrival put an end to its long repose,
tranquility and seclusion. Half a century later, the arrival of
Commodore Perry with his fleet of ‘black ships’ aggravated the
situation until it culminated in the Shogun’s resignation, and
withdrawal from a rule of the country which had lasted for two
hundred and fifty years.”1
In this quotation Okuma clearly seems to be implying that
Perry was more indebted than he would care to admit to a failed
Russian embassy that came five decades previously for his own
success in concluding a treaty opening two Japanese ports to
American ships. To say that Perry and his black ships merely
‘aggravated’ a pre-existing political situation in Japan, would
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seem to argue against the consistent claim by the Commodore
and Hawks, and the great majority of subsequent American
scholars of his expedition that all of the credit for opening
Japanese ports belongs to the Americans alone.2
That Okuma meant to underscore the importance of the
Rezanov mission to Perry’s later success is further supported by
comments he allegedly made at a speech given in July +3+0 on the
occassion of the conclusion of a pact between Russia and Japan.
These comments were alluded to by Ramming +3,0 in the
following manner :
“The late Marquis Okuma declared in +3+0, in one of his speeches,
during the World War, that the fame for having opened Japan’s
doors should belong to the Russian envoy Rezanov, not
Commodore Perry. This at first glance somewhat puzzling
assertion provoked bitter protests in the American press, by those
who had taken it in an unnecessarily literal sense ; for Okuma
wanted first of all to say something pleasant on the occasion of
the Russo-Japanese pact, which had just then gone into effect.”3
Nevertheless, given Okuma’s assertion, as quoted above from a
book published before the war +3+*, it would seem likely that
such comments also stemmed from his own personal conviction,
and not merely out of a politician’s desire to please the Russian
public.
In his book Japan’s Northern Frontier +3/- John A. Harrison
remarked that the attacks on the northern borders of Japan by
Russians in +2*01 which followed as a direct result of the

rejection of the Rezanov embassy, seemed to have been regarded
as a declaration of war. “Such apprehension was aroused that
Count Okuma Shigenobu has written that the events of +2*1
convinced the public-spirited men shishi of that day of the
necessity of opening the country to foreign trade.” Moreover, he
disagreed with Ramming as to the significance of the wartime
speech by Okuma. In a footnote, he added that “In a speech in
+3+0 Count Okuma, then premier of Japan, gave credit to Rezanov
for opening Japan, saying that it had been the Russians and not
Perry who opened the ports... This is an extremely significant
statement from one of the great statesmen of the Restoration.”+*
In The Russian Push Toward Japan +3/3, still a basic reference
book for scholars of Russo-Japanese history, the American
historian G. A. Lensen provided the first detailed narrative and
analysis of Rezanov’s mission in English, which was based
primarily on the original accounts of Krusenstern and Langsdorff,
as well as secondary sources in Russian and Japanese. Although
he did not have access to that portion of Rezanov’s diary that
concerned his stay in Nagasaki, he drew upon an article about his
mission by Voensky +23/ that referred to it. Lensen correctly
concluded that Rezanov’s embassy was not the complete failure
that it appeared to be at the time, nor as it was thought to be by
many in subsequent decades. He also noted Okuma’s opinion
about its legacy.
“Actually Rezanov had not failed as miserably as he himself had
assumed. Humiliated though he felt, he had been asked to do no
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more than to conform to the etiquette of the country and, in fact,
had not been forced to do so. From the Japanese point of view, he
had been permitted to abide by European customs. At their
rudest, the Japanese officials had treated him with greater respect
than some of his own mutinous subordinates. His diplomatic
efforts had made a more favorable impression on the Japanese
than on his own countrymen, so much so that Marquis Okuma
Shigenobu, one time Prime Minister of Japan, expressed the view
in later years that it was Rezanov who first really demonstrated
to the Japanese the need of opening the country.”++
The British historian James Murdoch also recognized the
importance of the Rezanov embassy. In his A History of Japan
+3,0 he points out that “The first accredited envoy from any
European Court to Japan, since the repulse of the mission from
Lisbon in +0.1, appeared at Nagasaki in +2*., on board the first
European man-of-war that ever cast anchor in a Japanese
harbour.” +, This fact has been largely overlooked by subsequent
historians, and by itself it seems to indicate that a new era of
intercourse with the West was about to begin.
However, some more recent British historians have paid little
attention to the Rezanov embassy and even interpreted it in a
contradictory manner, such as Beasley +3// who wrote that
“The second of these missions, that of Rezanov in +2*., was
treated with scant courtesy.” In contrast, Sansom +30- attested
that “The ambassador, Vasilii Rezanov, sic was treated politely
enough, but he met nothing but delay and obstruction for several

months. In March +2*/ he was told that instructions had come
from Yedo, and he must leave forthwith. This he did.” This
apparent contradiction in the characterization of its treatment
may be resolved if we suppose that what Beasley meant to say
was that meeting with “nothing but delay and obstruction for
several months” was, in European eyes, not very courteous. As we
shall see later, there were even some Japanese contemporaries of
Rezanov who felt the same way.+-
On the other hand, Japanese historians have tended to pay
much more attention to the Rezanov embassy, and its repatriation
of four Japanese drifters, despite its diplomatic failure. They
generally give equal emphasis to the other important dimensions
besides trade and diplomacy, such as in the broad areas of
language and culture, the development of friendly relations, and
the evolution of ideas about the proper stance of Japan toward
the outside world.
In his article “From sakoku to kaikoku : +2/-+2/2” Conrad
Totman +32* alluded to the historical antecedents to Perry, but
did not state specifically what they were. This author believes
that one of the most important of the historical precedents to the
opening of Japanese ports in those years was the Rezanov
embassy to Nagasaki.
In his later work on Japanese history +33- Totman gives a
brief account of the Rezanov embassy and the possible reasons
for its rejection by the shogunate. He suggests that the most
probable cause was the opposition of the imperial court in Kyoto,
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which also helps to explain the long delay in sending a reply to
Nagasaki. This accords with the explanation given to Rezanov by
the Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch.+.
The Japanese historian Miyachi Masato +321 stresses the
importance of the repatriation of the Japanese castaways with
both the Laxman and Rezanov missions.+/ Kisaki Ryohei +331
also attaches great importance to the return of the Japanese
drifters, even including them in the titles of his two companion
volumes concerning the Laxman and Rezanov expeditions, and
the Japanese drifters who were repatriated with them.+0
Ohshima Mikio ,*** stresses its historical interest in the
introduction to his Japanese translation of Rezanov’s Diary.
“Rezanov’s diary of his stay in Japan, forbidden by censorship to
be published in Russia for many years, contains many facts of
profound interest.” When read in concert with Japanese sources
he thought that it should clarify the actual conditions in which
his embassy to Nagasaki took place as one page in the history of
Russian and Japanese intercourse.+1
The Historical Background to the Rezanov Embassy
At the beginning of European intercourse with Japan, the Jesuit
missionary Francis Xavier in a letter to his superiors in Europe
pleaded that only the best and most energetic Catholic
missionaries be sent to Japan. Approximately one hundred years
later, after virtually all traces of Christianity in Japan had been
erased, the most desirable sort of person for a sojourn in Japan

was now transformed into its opposite. In +0/* the board of
directors of the Dutch United East India Company VOC stated
in a document that it was important. “to closely observe the
desires of this impudent, haughty and demanding nation and to
oblige them in every way.” It was further stressed that only.
“modest, humble, polite and free and friendly people.” were to be
sent to Dejima. Since then the best agents of the VOC in Japan
were considered to be the most obedient and submissive, the
humblest and most courteous. Although the VOC was formally
disbanded in +133, the Dutch traders confined to the artificial
island of Dejima were still expected to display when custom
demanded the outward signs of obeisance to the agents of
shogunal authority in Nagasaki in order not to endanger the
long-standing commercial relationship between Holland and
Japan. For a century and a half prior to the arrival of the Russian
embassy in Nagasaki in October +2*., there would have been very
few if any European witnesses to the external forms of this
submissive relationship other than the employees of the VOC and
its successor company itself.
Yet not even all of the earliest European visitors to Japan in the
late +0th and early +1th centuries were willing to obey Japanese
customs ; some, especially the military officers among the Iberians,
considered such submissive rituals to be beneath their dignity,
and insisted on showing courtesy in their own way, in accord
with European norms. This was probably a contributing factor in
the expulsion of the Spanish and Portuguese from Japan.
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In contrast to the prescribed meekness and obedience of the
Dutch merchants on Dejima, the determination by later European
envoys to Japan to adhere to their own diplomatic customs, and
rules of etiquette, even while in Japan, began in earnest with the
Russian envoy Adam Laxman in +13,3-.
Laxman’s visit to the northern island of Ezo Hokkaido and
his request to establish trade eventually prompted the head of the
shogunal senior council roju shuseki Matsudaira Sadanobu to
bestow the sanction of centuries-old ‘ancestral law’ on an actually
newly-created policy that excluded all foreign countries, including
neighboring Russia, from diplomatic communication tsushin or
from trade tsusho, except those nations with which it already
conducted such relations. Nevertheless, Sadanobu softened his
refusal by issuing a permit for one Russian ship to enter Nagasaki
harbor to pursue further negotiations concerning trade. In this
way, Laxman’s visit was the stimulus that set the shogunate on
track toward an increasingly militant exclusionist policy that was
justified by a subtle rewriting of history.
In his book about the arrival of the Perry expedition ,**-,
Mitani Hiroshi states that it was the expedition led by Rezanov
which prompted the shogunate to declare explicitly the implicit
principle enunciated by Sadanobu in his reply to Laxman in +13-.
This declaration then became the fundamental law of the land in
regard to foreign relations, and was maintained with
determination for the next half century.
“The ‘admonition’ given to him by the government put the

principles expressed to Laxman in even more concrete terms,
specifying four countries--China, Korea, Ryukyu, and
Holland--with whom Japan had relations of intercourse and
commerce,... At the beginning of the Tokugawa period, specific
countries had been forbidden to call at Japanese ports ; here,
conversely, the countries permitted access to Japan were listed.”+2
In +2*+ the Nagasaki interpreter of Dutch Shizuki Tadao, in
answer to arguments being advanced in favor of permitting trade
with Russia in the north of Japan, published his Sakokuron, which
was not an original work, but a translation of Kaempfer’s famous
late +1 th century essay about the advantages of the Tokugawa
decision to expel the Spanish and Portuguese and establish a
lasting peace in the country. By providing a name for the
shogunate’s new exclusionist foreign policy, it served to further
bolster the justification for it. Ironically, this title was based on an
inaccurate Dutch translation of the original German.+3
Since the late +2 th century especially, the Western world had
been rapidly moving in the direction of expanding commerce, the
exploration of the remotest areas of the earth and the gathering
of scientific knowledge about all the countries, peoples, animal
and plant species living on it. In the meantime, the Edo shogunate
was responding to the annoyances and threats posed by the
increasing number of Western ships encroaching upon Japan by
adopting an ever stricter isolationism. Sooner or later, these two
opposed tendencies were bound to collide against each other, and
to continue doing so, until one or the other changed course. The
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first serious challenge to the new ‘sakoku’ policy would come in
+2*. in the form of the Rezanov embassy.
A Brief Overview of the Aims of the Rezanov Embassy
A detailed chronological narrative of all the events and
negotiations between Rezanov and the Japanese officials in
Nagasaki that incorporates all original foreign and Japanese
sources would likely provide further insight into the historical
significance of this embassy. However, such a narrative clearly
lies beyond the scope of this article. Instead I will present only a
summary of some of the main events, and concentrate on lesser
known aspects of the embassy, in particular those that are amply
represented in Rezanov’s diary. Such an approach will I hope
facilitate a better understanding of not only the reasons for the
superficial failure of the embassy in its diplomatic and
commercial aims, but also provide insight into the other less
obvious dimensions in which it could be said to have had a
significant impact and achieved at least some measure of success.
In +2*, a plan was developed by an officer in the employ of the
Russian-American company, Lt. Commander Ivan Fyodorovich
Adam Johan Krusenstern, to supply Russian colonies in
Kamchatka, the Aleutian islands and Northwestern America more
reliably by sea and at the same to expand trade with China
through the port of Canton. This plan was advocated by the
director of the Russian-American company Nikolai Petrovich
Rezanov and gained the support of two of the Tsar’s key advisors,

the Ministers of the Navy and Commerce. Accordingly, it was
decided by the imperial Russian government to dispatch two
sailing vessels on an experimental round-the-world voyage the
first one for imperial Russian ships for such purposes. The
Russian emperor Alexander I moreover decided that advantage
should be taken of this naval expedition to send a new embassy
to Japan. He prevailed upon Rezanov, as a man of distinction, to
accept appointment as head of this embassy. To add prestige to
the embassy, Rezanov was named a Chamberlain of His Imperial
Highness and provided with a retinue of several officials. He was
also given much more authority than the previous Russian envoy
Adam Laxman had had and put in overall command of the
expedition. Krusenstern was relegated to the navigation and
command of the the ship and the discipline of the sailors, a fact
which he greatly resented. Among the personal retinue of
Rezanov was the German natural scientist and physician G. H.
Von Langsdorff.
The main aims of the Russian embassy were stated to be + the
opening of commercial relations with Japan on the basis of the
permit issued to Laxman, although its meaning was actually
ambiguous , the description of the Kuril islands, Sahalin, the
Amur estuary and the Strait of Tartary, - the investigation of
the whole eastern region of Siberia.
Besides Laxman’s permit, the return of four Japanese castaways
from Sendai was expected to lend humanitarian justification to
the visit of the Russian warship to Nagasaki. An additional
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strategy for the success of this first full-scale official embassy was
to exalt the status of the Japanese ‘emperor’ shogun to be equal
to that of the Russian emperor and Rezanov’s rank to that of
court chamberlain. However, as we shall see, paradoxically,
Rezanov’s perception of his own exalted status as the personal
envoy of the Russian Emperor Alexander I, and his extreme
devotion to him, as well as the Japanese view of his high rank,
would work against the success of his mission.
Rather than relying on Russian shipbuilders, two sailing vessels
of the latest design were purchased in London, and outfitted and
renamed the Neva and the Nadyezhda Hope. Both ships left the
Russian naval base of Kronstadt in the Baltic Sea in August +2*-.
In the Pacific en route to Kamchatka a violent dispute broke out
between Krusenstern and Rezanov, when the former refused to
recognize the latter’s overall command of the expedition, even
when presented with documents signed by the Russian emperor
himself. After an investigation was conducted by the
commandant of Kamchatka, Krusenstern was found to be guilty
of insubordination and forced to apologize to Rezanov. In this
case, Rezanov seems to have put the fulfillment of his mission to
Japan above his own personal honor. However, the insulting
treatment by Krusenstern and his subordinate officers and sailors
which Rezanov had had to endure seriously impaired his health ;
this in turn made him more susceptible to the profound ‘culture
shock’ and accompanying physical and mental distress he was to
experience in Nagasaki.

The Nadyezhda, flying the flag of the Imperial Russian navy,
carrying the Russian ambassador Chamberlain N. P. Rezanov,
entered the outer roadstead of the port of Nagasaki on October 3,
+2*.. It was, as quoted above, the first official embassy from a
European government to Japan in almost ,/* years. In addition, it
was the first European warship to ever enter a Japanese harbor,
the harbinger of the many foreign men-of-war that would
encroach more and more frequently and determinedly upon
Japanese shores in succeeding decades.,*
At his first formal interview with two banyoshi subordinate
officials commisioned by the magistrate sent aboard the Russian
ship late that first evening October 3 by the Nagasaki
magistrate, in answer to their inquiries about his rank, Rezanov
proudly replied : “I am one of the closest courtiers of the Russian
emperor dispatched as ambassador to His Tenjinkubo Majesty
shogun to testify how very pleased my Sovereign would be to
establish friendly relations with His Majesty ; he is returning some
of his subjects who were rescued on the shores of his Empire, and
I am charged with the task of affirming the eternal friendship
between their two great neighboring powers and of establishing a
mutually beneficial trade.” Nevertheless, Rezanov asserted that he
brought no goods, except gifts for the shogun, and that the
Russian ship was a warship, not a merchant vessel.
Even before the Russian ship had anchored a group of officials
who had approached his ship in a boat said that after waiting
twelve years for a Russian ship to appear they had despaired of
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ever seeing the Russians again. They asked why it had taken
them so long to return to Japan. Rezanov answered that it was on
account of the Napoleonic wars in Europe that they had been
unable to return earlier.,+
A Significant Clash of Cultures : What humiliation?
After the Japanese castaways were brought forward and
interrogated by the officials, Rezanov agreed to allow some of the
Dutchmen residing on Dejima to be brought into his cabin.
However, it was not until a whole hour had passed before they
were called from their boat and shown into his cabin ; even
though they had arrived before the Japanese they did not dare to
board the Russian ship until the chief interpreter had gone to tell
them that permission had been granted. Rezanov described this
first meeting with his fellow Europeans thusly :
We saw, finally, the opperhoofd of the Dutch factory Mr.
Hendrik Doeff, his secretary and the captain of the
Dutch ship Mousquetier coming toward us. They had
only just begun to greet me, when the chief interpreter
abruptly shouted for the opperhoofd to make a compliment.
The interpreter fell onto his knees and bowed, and the
Dutch had to do the same, bending at the waist before the
banyoshi, placing their hands on their knees, while glancing
to the side to see if the interpreter had finished his lengthy
speech and whether he permitted them to stand upright
again. This action was repeated during each conversation

with the banyoshi, and it was extremely distressing to the
Dutchmen to have us all as witnesses to their unprecedented
degradation.,,
This same encounter was described in much the same vein by
the two other main chroniclers of the embassy, Krusenstern and
Langsdorff, both of whom were also apparently eyewitnesses to it.
It was their descriptions, appearing in English translation, which
would shape the dominant Anglo-American view of this
cross-cultural encounter for the next fifty years. Krusenstern also
noted how the director of the Dutch factory Doeff, the
commanders of the two Dutch ships anchored in the harbor, and
another Dutchman were kept waiting in their boat for more than
an hour before being finally allowed to board the Russian ship. He
then described how :
...they had to all stand before the banyoshi several minutes,
bowing low, and the following order was given to them
through the interpreters. Myn Heer Oberhoft! Complement
bevore de opper Banios, that is, Mister Opperhoofd, bow
before the banyoshi. The latter did not show the slightest
sign of recognition of this submissive and humiliating
greeting.
Nevertheless, he recognized that even more submissive gestures
were required of the Japanese. He explained why these gestures
were not demanded of the Dutch, and noted that the Japanese did
not venture to require the members of the Russian embassy to
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perform them.
The external demonstration of submission by the
Dutchmen is not identical to that shown by the native
Japanese... Groveling on the ground would be extremely
uncomfortable for Dutchmen on account of their
tight-fitting clothing and also the inflexibility of their
bodies, not accustomed from an early age to such rituals.
However, in order to comply as nearly as possible with the
customs of the Japanese, the Dutchmen must bow lower
than the waist, and maintain that position with arms
extended downwards until such time as they receive
permission to stand upright again, usually only after
several minutes. The Japanese did not dare to subject us to
such demeaning acts.,-
This same intercultural encounter as described by Langsdorff
focuses primarily on the extremely submissive grovelling to
Western eyes of the Japanese interpreters before the “Great Man,
or Opperbanjos,” while the Dutchmen were also required to bow
their heads during the initial ceremony, and to remain in an
inclined position until they were told the ‘compliment’ was
finished.,.
From the above, it is clear that the perception of this encounter
by these three European witnesses was substantially the same.
However, it is also evident that Krusenstern, the young imperial

naval officer, was the most indignant at the ‘humiliation’ of the
Dutch and also the most militantly opposed to any hint by the
Japanese interpreters that he should perform the same
‘demeaning’ ritual
Rezanov then sat down in his armchair opposite the banyoshi,
while his staff officers stood behind him. Finally, he invited Doeff
to sit down and asked him about the usual conditions of their life
in Japan. Doeff answered that they were confined on Dejima and
that the strict surveillance imposed on them defied any
explanation. Despite this, whenever any foreign ship appeared in
Nagasaki, they were summoned by the magistrate who did
not do anything before he had heard their advice, as
representatives of a nation that had shown its loyalty to Japan for
more than two-hundred years. On the one hand, this sort of
Japanese reliance on the Dutch for advice in the case of visits of
foreign vessels seems quite credible, and is verified by later Dutch
reports. On the other hand, it is contradicted by what Doeff later
wrote about his alleged complete lack of influence with the
Japanese authorities.
Rezanov then reported that Doeff was suprised to hear that “we
the Russians succeeded in obtaining permission to trade.” This
is consistent with what Doeff later wrote in his recollections of
the Russian embassy. Finally, Doeff advised the Russian envoy
that in order to achieve the best success, he should promptly
comply with Japanese demands, no matter how strange they
might appear. After his conversation with Doeff had finished, the
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banyoshi asked Rezanov if he would conform to their customs.
“With great pleasure,” he replied, “insofar only as they do not
prejudice the dignity of my Sovereign.”,/
Accordingly, Rezanov readily agreed to surrender their
gunpowder and their weapons, except for those belonging to the
officers and his honor guard. He hoped that the Japanese
magnates would be so enlightened that they would not
themselves desire to prejudice the dignity of his sovereign, and
for that reason he asked them to allow the officers to retain their
swords and his honor guard their rifles. All other weapons he
declared himself ready to give up with the greatest pleasure.
This contradicts what Hawks wrote, as quoted above.
Doeff was assigned the task of trying to persuade the Russian
envoy to comply fully with the Japanese demands. He told him
that among the Dutch, including the ship captains, only he was
allowed to wear a sword, as the representative of an entire
republic, and warned that his obstinacy might lead to unpleasant
consequences.
Rezanov, however, resolutely replied that he would never agree
to such demands ; their captains were only the commanders of
merchant vessels, whereas he was the envoy of a great empire,
and that to deprive his officers of the symbols of their rank and
him of his honor guard would be as insulting for him as to take
away his sword which he was allowed to keep. For that reason,
no amount of persuading would deter him from what he
considered to be his just demand.

On the following day, the Japanese interpreters asked Rezanov
to go aboard a Japanese boat to pay honor to some subordinate
officials of the Nagasaki magistrate sent to represent him.
Rezanov refused on the grounds that he would not pay a visit to
any official beneath his rank, the only one being equal to him in
rank was the magistrate himself. Rezanov’s stubbornness won
out, and it was agreed that he would send a delegation of four
lower-ranking Russian officers to the boat to greet the Nagasaki
officials. These officers then went to the boat and greeted the
Japanese officials with the usual European-style bow and returned
to their ship. The Japanese officials followed them and were
greeted by a roll of drums and presentation of arms by Rezanov’s
honor guard when they stepped on to the forecastle. Rezanov
waited for them on the staircase leading to the door to his cabin
and then led them inside. The officials then seated themselves on
the sofa and a chair in Rezanov’s cabin, “all three in the European
fashion, not with their legs crossed like our visitors the evening
before.” This is the incident which Hawks garbled, and tried to
turn to Rezanov’s disadvantage. From Rezanov’s version of it,
confirmed by Langsdorff, we see that the three Japanese officials
have already begun to accommodate themselves to sitting in the
European manner.
After receiving their instructions from the banyoshi on their
knees, the interpreters turned around and announced to Rezanov
that the Nagasaki magistrate had decided to allow all the Russian
officers to wear their swords and the honor guard to retain their
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arms. Rezanov expressed his gratitude, saying that he could not
expect any other decision from such an enlightened official.
Shortly thereafter the opperhoofd Doeff, this time wearing his
ceremonial sword on his side, the two captains of the Dutch
merchant ships, and the Dutch traveller were shown into the
cabin. The original sources clearly indicate that Rezanov met
with the Dutch on two occasions, not only once, as is often
claimed.
They had just entered and scarcely had time to greet me,
when the interpreter suddenly turned them around,
instructing the baron to make a compliment to the
banyoshi. Then all of the Dutchmen stood for a long while
bent over, after which with the permission of the Japanese
banyoshi the interpreter showed them their places, but
ordered them to make a compliment beforehand to the
banyos sitting at one side.
After staying for dinner, the Hollanders took their leave,
and the chief interpreter again shouted for the
opperhoofd to make a compliment. The Hollanders stood
about five minutes bent over, and just as the traveller tried
to escape from this humiliation, the interpreter shouted for
him to make a compliment as well. The traveller thus had
to enter the cabin and bend his body over at the waist, as
he was told to.,0

Rezanov did not mention for how long they had to maintain
this bent over position, but presumably it was for at least a few
minutes. From this passage we can see that while the Dutch had
to give their. ‘compliments’ in semi-Japanese style to the banyoshi,
the Russians would only pay their respects with a slight nod in
European fashion.
Rezanov later described the prescribed rituals of submission
and obedience shown by the Japanese interpreters of Dutch to the
banyoshi, and also acknowledged that they seemed much more
degrading and servile than those the Dutch were required to
perform.
Langsdorff also describes in detail this second meeting with the
Dutch, but he is the only one who clearly acknowledges that their
seeming ‘humiliation’ was an artifact of their own purely
European perspective.
As Mynheer Doeff entered the cabin, he was immediately
turning to the ambassador to pay him the proper salutation ;
but the interpreters took him politely by the arm, turned
him aside gently, and said that he must first make a
compliment to the Great Men. This was done in a very
demeaning manner, according to our ideas, italics added
as he stood for some time before them with his head bent
downwards, and his arms hanging perpendiculularly by his
sides, not daring on any account to raise his head. As,
however, he thought, after awhile, he had kept it in this
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position long enough, he turned it half round on one side,
and asked the interpreter, Kan ik wederom opstaan? May I
raise it up again? A like compliment must also be paid to
the secretary and the Banjos ; and then he was permitted to
pay his respects to the ambassador.”
“Towards eleven o’clock, the treasurer and secretary took
their leave ; but before their departure the Dutchmen were
again required to pay a compliment to the Great Men. Baron
Pabst, who before did not seem to think this attitude of
submission altogether consistent with the Dutch character,
wanted to have stolen unseen out of the cabin, and escaped
the compliment ; but the vigilant interpreters called after
him : ‘Sir! Mynheer Pabst! You cannot go till you have made
the Great Men a compliment.’ He was therefore obliged to
return, and submit to the humiliating custom.”,1
The mention of the Dutch traveller Baron Pabst above is
interesting in that it suggests that other Dutchmen, who were not
employees of the Dutch trading company, nor ship captains
engaged in the trade with Japan, were not comfortable
performing these peculiar greeting rituals. Krusenstern did not
describe this second encounter with the Dutchmen. He only
mentioned that during this second visit. “one of the interpreters
lightly touched my spine with his hand ; but when I glanced
backwards and gave him an indignant look, they did not dare to
make any such further attempts.” This was certainly the attitude

to be expected of a proud naval officer of his rank and dignity.,2
In general, Krusenstern felt that : “It is impossible to regard
without indignation the abasement of respected people at the feet
of Japanese officials, who sometimes lack any education, and who
do not respond to this humiliating demonstration of submission
with even the slightest nod of the head.” He further noted that
these Japanese officials banyoshi were only temporarily granted
their exalted status.
“The extraordinary submissiveness with which the interpreters
spoke with the banyoshi compelled us in the beginning to think
these officials held high status ; however, at last, we learned that
their rank was in itself not at all elevated. The great respect
shown to them continues only as long as they are carrying out
the duties assigned to them by the magistrate.”,3
What Krusenstern especially failed to recognize was the extent
to which the Dutch traders on Dejima were integrated into the
neo-Confucian inspired social structure and hierarchy of the
bakuhan system. The Dutch opperhoofd was recognized as a
minor daimyo with the right to have a shogunal audience in Edo.
The fact that the Dutch were foreigners excused them from
having to make the extreme prostrations that the Japanese
daimyo and other lower officials had to perform. As modern,
post-Enlightenment educated Europeans, they found these
obligatory rituals of submission and obedience to the shogun very
boring, and uncomfortable, but they could not really complain
that they were ‘humiliating’ as they were not required to do more
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than the Japanese themselves, and, in fact, even less.
This is the point of view of Hendrik Doeff as expressed in his
Recollections, in which he included a vigorous rebuttal of the
critical portrayal of him found in the accounts of Krusenstern and
Langsdorff. He noted that the refusal of Rezanov to surrender
some of the Russians’ arms, while being willing to hand over all
of the Russians’ gunpowder, seemed odd to the Japanese officials.
He considered Rezanov to be “as stubborn in this case as he was
unwilling to use forms of Japanese courtesy, which the Japanese
interpreters urged him to do.”
According to Doeff, Langsdorff’s account of his meeting with
Rezanov and the obligatory ‘compliments’ to the banyoshi, was in
some respects lacking in detail, and in other ways simply wrong.
It gave the false impression that Doeff had forgotten to respect
Japanese customs and the Japanese interpreters had had to
remind him to do so. But such a reminder was “truly
unnecessary.” As he explained, “During a five-year stay I was
thoroughly acquainted with the customs of the country and no
interpreter had to bring them to my attention.” He also felt that
he didn’t deserve to be made into an object of scorn and ridicule
by Langsdorff. “For after all, as Langsdorff acknowledged himself,
I rendered essential service to the Russians because as a result of
my speech, I was able to assure that their ship could change its
anchorage that same evening from a position so dangerous that a
strong gust of wind would have thrown it against a cliff.” He also
lambasted Krusenstern for his ethnocentrically biased account of

the encounter :
Krusenstern commits the same indecency as Langsdorff,
and besides these two, there are a lot of people reproaching
the Dutch, and they see it as a self-abasement that they
follow the customs and courtesies of Japan. I myself cannot
understand in what this self-abasement consists. The
courtesies that we use in our relations to Japanese are the
same that they use among themselves. They don’t demand
from us that we show more respect to their superiors than
the Japanese themselves do. The customs of the country are
that way, and in whatever part of the world one finds
oneself, one has to adapt or agree to the reigning customs
and ceremonies. Otherwise, one need not go there at all...
After all, one cannot expect that a host nation will adjust
to the customs of visitors who come in friendship. And so
there is nothing abject or degrading in the fact that one
follows the customs and courtesies of a host nation as
long as one is not compelled to express greater submission
and inferiority than the members of such a society show to
each other. To portray something in a ridiculous light,
although it has nothing ridiculous about it, is not very
difficult, and one could make fun of the ambassador
Rezanov himself. But, in that case, I would not direct my
scorn at the envoy as at the one who sent him, and my
respect for his majesty the emperor of Russia compels me
to remain silent.-*
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Not only did strict conformity with Japanese customs tend to
make Westerners seem ridiculous in the eyes of their fellow
Europeans, but their obedience to Japanese prohibitions on
communication between Europeans in Nagasaki could even make
them seem ‘uncivilized’ to each other. We have seen how an
example of the former occurred during the obligatory paying of
‘compliments’ to the banyoshi. An instance of the latter can be
seen in the prohibition by the Nagasaki magistrate of any free,
unregulated communication between members of the Russian
embassy, which included Germans and other non-Russian
nationalities, and the Dutchmen on Dejima.
After the above-described two encounters between Rezanov and
his staff officers and Doeff and his secretary and the two captains
of the Dutch ships, no further meetings were allowed between
them during the entire six months that the Russian embassy
remained in Nagasaki. Nevertheless, the magistrate did permit a
limited exchange of correspondence and gifts between Doeff and
Rezanov.
It is often mistakenly thought that Rezanov was forced to
completely conform to the ‘humiliating’ social customs and
‘ridiculous’ demands of the Japanese. However, this was not at all
the case. He was always insistent on maintaining his own dignity
as ambassador and would not agree to any Japanese demands
that he felt would compromise that dignity. He showed his
willingness to compromise and conform to Japanese customs
whenever they did not come into conflict with the maintenance of

his own ambassadorial dignity, as defined by his own culture and
in particular by his devotion to his sovereign, the Russian
emperor. For example, from the very beginning when meeting
with the banyoshi, he always insisted on sitting in his own
armchair, and would not give it up to them, despite their demands
to do so.
Learning about each other : Japanese and Russian Language
and Culture
From the very beginning both sides showed an interest in
learning each other’s language and acquiring a variety of
information about the culture, politics, technology and geography
of each country. For his part, Rezanov had already begun
learning Japanese from the Japanese castaways on board the ship,
and now set about actively aquiring more vocabulary and
information about Japanese customs, festivals, and politics.
Rezanov showed his interest in Japanese language and culture
and evinced a desire to communicate with Japanese directly and
intimately from the very first days of his long stay in Nagasaki.
He also responded to their eager and insistent requests to be
taught Russian. In return, the interpreters are said to have
promised to teach him Japanese, although this was strictly
forbidden by shogunal edicts.
Responding to shogunal orders, some of the Japanese
interpreters of Dutch oranda tsuji were busily acquiring
vocabulary in Russian, asking for names of numerous objects on
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the ship. They promised to be able to speak the language in three
months, and regretted that Rezanov did not bring them an
alphabet. The interpreters pestered the Russian officers about
Russian words for things while others wrote them down. Their
inquisitiveness, retentive memories, and keenness to learn
surprised and impressed Rezanov and his officers. Rezanov
thanked them for their efforts in Japanese and officials contrary
to custom answered in Japanese to several of his queries in that
language. They laughed at his pronunciation, and the interpreters
corrected him.
The interpreters also initiated a very concrete dialog about
possibilities of trade, asking questions about how many ships the
Russians could send, what goods they could bring and how long
the voyage would take. The Russians replied that it would take
only one month from Kamchatka or Russian America. The
Japanese were particularly anxious to understand the relative
geographical position of Kamchatka to Japan. They begged to be
shown some of the Russians’ maps and demonstrated considerable
knowledge of geography. The Japanese were astonished to learn
that Russia had colonies in America. Rezanov showed them a
pocket globe, which they greatly admired. They knew that the
earth was round but had not seen it represented in this way
before.-+
The chief interpreter Ishibashi Sukezaemon demonstrated more
knowledge of world geography than Krusenstern expected him to
have but seemed to profess ignorance about the geography of the

Japanese islands themselves. In fact, the interpreters were in the
beginning afraid to talk about the geography of the Japanese
islands, or their rulers, and the structure of their own
government, but by the end of Rezanov’s prolonged stay in
Nagasaki, they had become so intimate with and trusting of him,
that they confided to him considerable information about it. By
doing so, they were violating very strict laws against revealing
such information to foreigners, which action could have cost them
their lives, if it were reported to higher authorities.
Within a week of the arrival of the Russian embassy, after a
Dutch and Japanese translation of the Russian emperor’s letter to
shogun, had been made, all the Japanese officials in Nagasaki,
from the magistrates on down, learned that Rezanov was not at
all a petty naval lieutenant like Laxman, but a high-ranking court
chamberlain of Tsar Alexander I. For that reason, the magistrates
had ordered that such a distinguished personage from Russia be
received with the utmost respect and esteem. Japanese asked him
about the orders and ribbons he wore. They reportedly told him
of their own bondage and servitude. He showed them portraits of
the Russian emperor and empress. Sukezaemon said that he had a
portrait of Catherine II wearing a blue ribbon that was obtained
from the Dutch. During this time, the Japanese drifters brought
back to Japan were presented to the banyoshi dressed in their silk
clothes and each with silver watch and twenty ducats given to
them by Alexander I.-,
Rezanov asked one of interpreters to write his name for him, and
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was surprised when he wrote it in Russian. This was Baba
Tamehachiro, who was very happy to be praised by Rezanov. All
the interpreters reportedly assured him that they would soon be
able to write in Russian. Rezanov promised to compose an
alphabet for them to study.--
On October +0, while the Russian ship was being towed to an
anchorage closer to town, the banyoshi stayed on board and
asked minute questions again about geography, and wanted to
obtain all possible information about the situation, extent and
population of the Russian empire. They followed the Russian
ship’s route on a map and asked minutely about distances from
place to place ; they begged to see the pocket globe again that was
so much talked about in Nagasaki, and asked a lot of questions
about arts and manufactures in Russia. Specimens were shown
them. They admired the astronomical instruments, but had no
idea how to use them.-.
On November + Krusenstern went ashore to the island of
Kibachi with several other officers ; they were escorted by a
multitude of boats with armed soldiers. He made his observations
in order to take the altitude of the sun, and took soundings of the
creek to see if it was suitable for repairing the ship. The Japanese
officials did not oppose them, but were said to be very courteous
and kind, and looked on with great curiosity. They politely took
up the sextants and examined them with pleasure, explaining that
the Dutch did not have such instruments.
On the next day some more Russian officers went ashore to

Kibachi in a sail boat, tacking back and forth against the wind.
The guard boats were alarmed by the Russians’ back and forth
movements, but calmed down, when they finally realized that the
Russians were in fact headed for the shore. The Japanese were
very friendly toward them, and showed them how their guns
were fired, showed them maps and their medicine boxes, etc. in
order to attract their interest and entertain them.-/
On December ,. th Rezanov declared that he was dissatisfied
with the work of the interpreter Motoki Shozaemon and asked for
a different interpreter--Sukezaemon. This strongly suggests that
Rezanov by this point understood Japanese well enough to be
able to judge the accuracy with which his words were being
conveyed. Thus, despite the lack of progress on the diplomatic
front, he was making good progress on the linguistic side. On the
following day two banyoshi came to assure him that his words
were being faithfully conveyed to them.
As late as March ,/ Rezanov reported that he continued to try
to study Japanese from the guard officers. During his fourth
audience with the special envoy from Edo and the Nagasaki
magistrates, April 1 Rezanov made the unprecedented request
to be address ed by those officials directly in Japanese, thereby
bypassing the Japanese interpreters of Dutch oranda tsuji. The
interpreters at first told him that that was impossible, but
Rezanov eventually prevailed on them to convey his request to
the officials, who agreed to converse directly with Rezanov in
Japanese. This certainly is indicative of the progress he had made
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in Japanese during the several months of his enforced idleness in
Nagasaki.
On April +- Rezanov conversed with three officials from Edo in
Japanese in the presence of Tamehachiro ; they told him that all
Japanese who love their fatherland regret the departure of the
Russians. He wrote a Japanese saying in kana on their fans. They
said they would report the marvel that the Russian envoy not
only speaks Japanese, but can also write it. Rezanov replied that
it cannot really be considered a marvel as Russians really love
Japanese. The officials drank a glass of wine and reaffirmed how
much the Russians were loved in Nagasaki.
Strictly Confidential : Divulging State Secrets to Foreigners
On January -, +2*/ the interpreter Tamehachiro confided to
Rezanov, when the latter asked him why he must wait so long for
an answer from Edo, that the temporal sovereign shogun alone
could not decide and so an envoy was sent to Miyako to consult
with the spiritual emperor tenno and as soon as an answer was
received from there, a courier would be sent to Nagasaki. He
added that the day before a proclamation from the magistrates
declared that Russians be considered friends and that Japan was
on the best possible terms with Russia. As a result, the fleet of at
least forty guard boats of the daimyo of Chikugo was sent back.
The Russians indeed saw how all the boats bearing his flag went
out to sea. In addition, they observed that the arms of the
guard-boats of Hizen were laid aside.-0

Langsdorff confirmed the substance of this conversation when
he reported that the interpreters told Rezanov and his officers in
confidence that the answer from Edo was so long in coming
because the ‘emperor’ had sent one of his first councillors to the
dairi ; not being agreed about the reception of the ambassador,
they were both conducting intrigues to carry the issue. It was
hoped that a decisive answer would arrive in +/,* days.
January ,.-1
Krusenstern also believed that the ‘kubo’ shogun would not
venture to make a decision in such an important matter as the
Russian embassy without consulting with the ‘dairi’ tenno.
Unlike Rezanov, he did not report any conversation with an
interpreter in this regard. As he had little contact with the
interpreters, it is likely that he heard a report of Rezanov’s
conversation from one of the officers of his retinue, perhaps
Langsdorff.-2
Then, around the end of January, in response to Rezanov’s
exasperation at the long delay in receiving an answer from Edo,
Tamehachiro obliged him by telling him “a profound secret.” This
was the fact that two hundred of the highest dignitaries had been
assembled in Edo to consult together upon the expediency of
establishing trade relations with Russia, and that this was the
cause of so many delays. The government took it is a
fundamental law that everything be done on a solid foundation.
In this sense, he thought that the slowness itself was a good sign.
At this point, Rezanov must have realized that his embassy had
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provoked a ‘great debate’ among the ruling circles of the country,
and that the diplomatic success of his embassy hinged upon the
outcome.
On March ,/ Rezanov reported a conversation with the guard
officers about trade ; they told him that they would eagerly wait
for a Russian ship. They told him that they all desired that and
that they loved the Russians more than they themselves perhaps
realized. They maligned the interpreters as rogues who loved the
Hollanders and hindered the Russians. They were afraid they had
said too much, but Rezanov assured them he knew the price of
their sincerity. Their comments about the interpreters hindering
the Russians certainly do not agree with what the interpreters
themselves repeatedly told Rezanov, and with a passion that
bespoke sincerity. It would be wise therefore to take these
remarks in context.
Rezanov noted that they were critical of their government, and
said that they desired to go to Russia, where freedom reigned and
the benevolent Alexander sat on the throne, as they had heard
from the Japanese drifters. Almost every one of them was willing
to be very candid with Rezanov in one-to-one conversation. As
they had two emperors, each with their own gifts and faults, he
asked them which one was more benevolent. They countered that
they had only one emperor, and not two. They told him that the
kubo shogun was not the tenshi, but only the first daimyo in
the country, and that the emperor was tenshi. They claimed that
the kubo does not do anything without his approval and sends to

him for confirmation. However, countered Rezanov, if the kubo
sends an order to you to slit your abdomen, you must obey.
Therefore, he must be ruler of all, and is stronger than the dairi.
The latter is a sacred person, they declared. He is not supposed to
occupy himself with secular affairs. He prays to the gods for us,
and we are happy by his prayers. Rezanov, seeking further
explanation, countered : “But before he ruled over everything.”
They finally replied : “Of course, he ruled, but as it pleased the
gods.” In the end, they asked to leave the topic and said that it
was enough for him to understand that none of them equates the
kubo with the tenshi. Indeed, it was only Westerners, based on
Kaempfer’s misleading conception of coequal spiritual and
temporal emperors, who thought that. Rezanov had now learned
what very few, if any, foreigners knew : what Japanese
commoners themselves thought.
On another occasion, Rezanov finally persuaded his guard
officer friends to reveal the name of the shogun to him. They told
him that it was “Ieri-ko” Ienari. Whether they left out one
syllable deliberately, or whether Rezanov did not hear it, is not
clear. Nevertheless, it is a close approximation to his name, with
the addition of the honorific title ‘ko,’  and something
ordinarily forbidden for foreigners to know.
Rezanov tried to find out more information about the political
structure of Japanese government, but was rarely able to have a
one-on-one conversation with the guards. Nevertheless, he did
obtain accurate information about how the five daimyo were
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chosen to serve on the goroju, and one selected to head it, and
about the three great officials called gosankisama gosankei, who
were second in rank to the ‘emperor’ or shogun. They were said to
be incomparably higher in rank than the ordinary daimyo, who in
turn were higher than the Nagasaki magistrates, who were only
hatamoto. March ,0
After being officially informed that the envoy from Edo would
arrive in two days, Rezanov spent the remaining part of the day
March ,1 chatting with the guard officers. He added to his
dictionary and asked as much as he could about morals and
customs of their society. He also obtained some information about
inheritance customs, and also about the dependence of Ryukyu on
the ‘prince of Satsuma’
On March ,3 the long-awaited envoy from Edo arrived at noon.
The guard officers came in holiday dress in order to congratulate
Rezanov on the arrival of the envoy, who would they said spend
all day drinking sake with the magistrates. Rezanov chatted with
the young guard officers and asked if they wanted to be a
daimyo, or a magistrate. They answered that that was impossible,
because all such positions, even their own, were hereditary. The
guards seemed so flattered by Rezanov’s attention that they
reportedly agreed for the first time to let two extra Russians stay
onshore--which was against the strict shogunal regulations, and
so at considerable risk to themselves, if reported to higher
authorities.
The next day March -* the guard officers told Rezanov that

they saw an engraved portrait of him, wearing his dress uniform
with ribband, and a large hat. They added that many were sent to
Miyako and Edo and that the Chinese bought a lot ot them and
sent them to Nanking with junks going there. He asked them to
get him a copy, but they said they couldn’t possibly do that. On
March -+ Rezanov chatted as usual with the guard officers and
found out some more details of Chinese trade in Nagaski.-3
On April + a guard officer named Sasaki was very candid
one-on-one about trade. He assured Rezanov that the interpreters
were trying to hinder them, in order to serve the Hollanders, who
always generously reward them, but that Japanese merchants
desire trade with Russia. He also gave him concrete advice about
what articles to bring for trade.
The day after Rezanov had had his farewell audience with the
envoy from Edo, Shozaemon said in despair that the interpreters
had never expected such a decision. He divulged the secret that
Laxman really had been given permission to trade, but it was
ambiguous. At that time there were many discussions at the
court, but two grandees whose opinions carried great weight
insisted that it was to Japan’s advantage to have trade and
intercourse with a neighboring power like Russia. Most of the
courtiers also thought so. If the Russians had come back in six or
even eight years, they would have been received joyfully, but in
the sixth year one grandee died, and in the eighth year the last
one died, and people of the opposing party took their place. When
the Russians finally came, it took a great effort to overturn the
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previous opinion, because the emperor shogun himself was
disposed favorably to Russia. They hurried to summon
government ranks, who agreed with the opinion of these
grandees ; that is why it took six months. However, with the
passage of time the previous opinion might again triumph, it was
added.
The three senior interpreters told him that they considered the
day of refusal a misfortune, and that it may one day be rectified.
They told him that changes may be expected, that Rezanov can
write to them via the Dutch, who they assured him were
favorably inclined to Russia. They maintained that the Dutch had
no influence on government affairs, and that Doeff still did not
know that the Russians were refused, but would soon be told.
Rezanov thanked them for their sincerity. They claimed that nary
a person could be found who did not regret the refusal of the
Russian proposals, and reminded him that public opinion means a
lot everywhere. April 2
On April +* Rezanov spoke Japanese with two senior banyoshi
and Shozaemon. The former wanted to know where he had
learned Japanese. “Here, sitting behind the bamboos” he replied.
“My sincere attachment to your country helped me.” “Rest
assured, we will never forget you,” they said. Shozaemon then had
a very revealing and somewhat puzzling conversation with
Rezanov in private. “You must know now how you were refused,
but you should not despair at all, all is subject to change, the
people want to enter into trade relations with you, and that must

happen sometime. We will write to you via the Dutch and you
can conduct trade together with them.”
“That’s impossible,” Rezanov replied.
“Alright” but when you get our letter, send a good head with
Dutch ships. We guarantee that the Dutch will keep this secret,
and then we will make a good and general plan. If you hear of a
big change in Japan, you can boldly approach our shores under
guise of distress to your ship, and then your reception will be
from the beginning one of trade, for the government will not miss
a chance to rectify its mistake. By the way, don’t forget the
north.” Rezanov couldn’t understand what he meant by this
statement and the entry of other interpreters into the room at
that moment prevented him from clarifying what he meant by
it..*
On April ++ Shozaemon again began in conversation with
Rezanov to hatch new plans to establish trade. He thought that in
about six years the Russians would reappear and in ten for sure.
“That’s not so easy” Rezanov cautioned him. Shozaemon
responded that he would apply his cleverness to achieve this goal
before he died. He promised that he would write to him every
year, candidly, about how to achieve this goal. “You know what a
great influence we interpreters here have ; the Hollanders must do
all that we desire, and you can on basis of my letter send a ship
together with the Hollanders. We will force them to request this,
and our government will agree to it. Here is the beginning for
you.” He said that he was president of the junior interpreters.
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When a vacancy occurred he would be promoted to the ranks of
the senior interpreters, and by custom assume the presidency of
the senior interpreters. He promised that he would exert stronger
leadership over the interpreting caste. At the same time, he said
that he had suggested to the magistrates, and would continue to
do so, how advantageous it would be for Japan to have ties with
Russia and and how shameful their refusal was, if they don’t
rectify it. “You write cautiously from your side, but don’t write
from the north, about which I reminded you yesterday. Give some
time, and you will see, what a person can do, who knows the
value of life.” .... “You have in me a true friend of Russia, and all
Nagasaki feels the same...The change of only one person is needed,
and then all obstacles will be removed.” He would not give the
name of this individual, saying it was not necessary for him to
know. “Remember that during the whole of your stay here there
were changes in your intercourse with us : now too polite, now
too cold ; you didn’t give any reason for this and must have seen
the vacillation of court intrigues, now in your favour, now against
you, and we acted towards you as we were ordered to.” He
reminded him that while he complained about the lack of freedom
and not being allowed to go beyind the bamboo fence, he was
only experiencing a temporary deprivation of freedom. In
contrast, generations of Japanese must endure it endlessly. “In
Japan they do not allow us to have individual feelings.” he said
passionately. Rezanov marvelled at his candor. Then Rezanov
went outside and thanked the workers, or coolies, who said that

they were glad to serve the Russians, and asked them to come
back to Nagasaki. They were driven off, but came back again and
asked various questions, such as, how far it was to Russia. They
asked Rezanov to give them work, and declared their readiness to
serve him. He answered all of them in Japanese, until a junior
banyos drove them off in earnest. They only laughed, and then
bowed to him from a distance.
On April +, Tachikiro told Rezanov : “Don’t forget Japan, she
loves the Russians ; I will write to you.” Then Sukezaemon, the
head of all the interpreters told him privately : “Write to us, and
we will inform you about everything. Do not suspect the Dutch.”
Rezanov replied : “I will write to you in brief, but you may write
to me at length.” Unfortunately, because of Rezanov’s untimely
death, such a correspondence could never take place..+
On April +- Tamehachiro was even more candid about the
political debates and intrigues in Edo and Miyako sparked by the
Russians’ arrival, naming names and going into more details.
Unfortunately, the names of the lords who were supposedly in
favor of trading with the Russians may have been made up, for
they cannot be positively linked to any real individuals.
Tamehachiro claimed that Laxman had actually been given
permission to trade, and that the return of the Russians was
impatiently awaited. However, the leader of the pro-Russia faction
died, and the opposing faction became stronger.
“The people then wanted trade with you, but you weren’t here,
and all was quiet. As soon as you came, the emperor shogun
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proclaimed his agreement, but one clever lord... stopped the
emperor and said that the fundamental laws demand the consent
of the dairi, and in particular in the case of the establishment in
Japan of a new and strong Christian nation. In the court of the
dairi, or spiritual emperor, he made the suggestion, that the kubo
is usurping the authority of the latter, that when Laxman was
given the permit, the dairi was not consulted, which is true...
Finally the dairi declared that the resolution of such an important
matter demanded the consent of government ranks, who, upon
gathering, yielded to the intrigues of the clever lord, whose name
you should not ask us... I will only tell you that the emperor
shogun is on your side, but yielded this time so as not to
provoke a civil war... So, you see, we in Japan do not keep our
word so strictly, and Japanese laws are the same as in other
countries, and subject to alteration by cunning minds.”
This sort of candid confession may lack accuracy in certain
details, but overall it seems to provide a reasonable picture of the
kind of intrigues occuring among the different elements of the
political elite. For Rezanov it clearly revealed that there were
those among the top leadership who favored dealing with the
Russians, including the shogun himself, but, as the latter’s power
was not absolute, he had had to yield to those opposed to trade
with Russia. It foreshadowed the struggle for the restoration of
imperial power that would intensify after the signing of the first
treaties with the Western powers in the +2/*s.
Rezanov then asked Tamehachiro to tell him about

governmental structure in Japan, and the latter obliged him,
telling him that the government council consisted of “five first
rank councillors and five second rank, goroju and wakatoshi
yori...” Rezanov then asked if the Hizen ‘prince’ was not a
government councillor. Without mentioning the word tozama, he
explained accurately why he could not be. Then he elucidated the
function of the sankei, who were not supposed to interfere in the
shogunal administration. They may only run the personal affairs
of the shogun as his close relatives. He stressed that the roju and
wakatoshiyori were the actual rulers of the government. From this
quite accurate account, Rezanov surmised that the so-called
Japanese ‘emperor,’ or shogun, was not so autocratic if his top
counsellers could frustrate his will.
On April +. Rezanov was informed about the organization of
the Nagasaki interpreters into two classes of senior and junior :
otsuji, and kotsuji, as well as other details concerning their
leadership and means of selection. Shozaemon again assured
Rezanov that all the interpreters would make every effort to
establish trade. He mentioned that he and another interpreter may
perhaps go to Edo next year to lobby on the Russians’ behalf.
“Public opinion is already in your favor ; we will spread it from
south to north.” Rezanov asked him to explain more clearly about
his previous. ‘north’ comment, but the latter only laughed and
said that he would never receive an answer to such a question.
Rezanov asked him for the name of the. ‘clever lord’ who had
insisted that the imperial court in Kyoto be consulted about the
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important issue of establishing trade relations with Russia.
Tamehachiro hesitated for a long time, but finally did provide his
name and that of the province he ruled. However, once again
neither can be definitively linked with a real individual. It seems
that he was endeavouring to please Rezanov, but at the same time
protecting himself from being accused of the capital crime of
divulging such secrets to foreigners. Nevertheless, Tamehachiro
implored Rezanov not to mention what he had said to the other
interpreters as it would spell his doom.
Their conversation was again broken off by the arrival of two
Edo functionaries who told him how unpleasant it was for them
to part from such people who have earned the affection and
respect of all. Finally, one of them, taking his hand, said : “We
take our leave from you. but we will take to Edo that good
opinion which the Russians have here earned.” Shozaemon then
let him know with his eyes how great was his success. Rezanov
spoke with the Edo officials in Japanese, and they were delighted
by it : “What a pity that they cannot hear our conversation in
Edo.”
The Nagasaki official said without any apprehension as well
that the refusal of the Russians elicited the disgust of all the
people, for all--from the highest to the lowest--are certain that the
Russians are kind people. The Edo functionaries confirmed that
this was true, saying that every Japanese must feel the same way,
and also vouching for the daimyo and the magistrates. “What to
do?” answered Rezanov, “that the good intention of my sovereign

was not accepted here, even though it would have been for your
own advantage.”.,
On April +0 the majority of guard officers told Rezanov
sincerely that they themselves did not understand Japanese laws,
that the whole town regrets that the Russians were refused, and
that the reasons were not publicized. They gave him their fans to
autograph and promised to keep them as souvenirs of the
embassy of such a great monarch. Rezanov wrote on the wall in
Japanese that the Russian envoy thanks the kind Japanese for
their friendship, which he will never forget.
On the morning of April +1 the senior interpreters came and
said that they would write to Russia via the Dutch, who want to
see you in Japan. “Do you know that only recently they again
began to send two ships here? Their trade suffered for seven
years ; war with England did not let them send ships here, except
one small one, and then finally their own, but under American
flag. Then the government was on your side, and if you had only
come, you would have been very glad.” Dutch trade had indeed
suffered during those years, and American and other ships had
had to be hired to carry trading goods. If a Russian ship had come
during that time, this passage strongly suggests that it could
have been either disguised as a Dutch one, or perhaps even
admitted to trade on the basis of the Nagasaki permit.
They added that upon the death of the ‘clever minister’ or in
case of other changes, they would write openly. Then he can send
one or two Russians via Batavia, who can live on Dejima
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disguised as Hollanders. The Dutch are willing to keep it a secret,
but it is necessary that Batavia be on the side of Russia. “When
you send one person here with a good head, then we can tell him
openly, for with the Dutch we can interact more freely. Then you
can go to Kamchatka and send a ship from there to approach our
shores. A kind reception will then be assured by the fact that the
government is ready too rectify its mistake and begin substantive
talks.
Rezanov was skeptical of such schemes, but the interpreters
assured him that as the Russians were being allowed to leave
despite Japanese laws, how can the talks not be substantive? If
they go to Matsumae for talks, they would not get anywhere, but
in Nagasaki all the interpreters are ready to do the Russians’
bidding. He thanked them for the advice, and judged all their
plans to be feasible..-
Demonstrating Western Scientific Progress : Electron Rushes
and Hot Air Balloons
In order to educate and entertain the Japanese officials who
came to visit, Doctor Langsdorff demonstrated the use of an
electrical machine and conducted various experiments, which
they appreciated. Indeed, Langsdorff noted that this machine was
“the object which more than any other attracted the attention,
and excited the astonishment of the Japanese. Very rarely did a
banjos...come to visit us, without desiring to feel the effect of the
electricity, or to see some experiments.” December ,,..

On January +/ toward evening Langsdorff launched a hot air
balloon. It was /* feet in circumference and rose up into the air
very well. The Japanese officers were very glad to see such a
spectacle and appreciative of the experiment. The Russians also
conducted some electrical experiments for the edification and
entertainment of the interpreters, which both surprised and
gratified them.
Three days later some Japanese guards came with a request to
launch another balloon. Langsdorff willingly did so. The balloon
rose very well, but the rope got tangled with roof and it flew
horizontally into the bay. Japanese boats brought it back soaking
wet, and it was a big job to repair it../
On February 0 Langsdorff requested permission to launch a
large hot air balloon again. On one side was a sketch of the
two-headed eagle, and on the other the monogram of the Russian
emperor with his crown, and other decorations. Rezanov gave his
approval after the interpreters had assured him several times that
the whole town would be glad to see it. The balloon rose up very
high and flew over the whole town, but got a little rent in the
upper part and fell onto the roof of a merchant. The burning
spirit in the globe caught fire and so much smoke issued from it,
that people thought it was a fireball. The merchant, feeling
alarmed by it, tried to dowse it with water. It was taken to the
magistrate who had been forewarned by the interpreters. He
proved to be a reasonable man and no disagreeable consequences
ensued. He merely sent word to Rezanov that the next time it
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should be launched when the wind was blowing out to sea..0
Cross-Cultural Dialogs : What confinement?
All of the conversations that Rezanov conducted with his
Japanese counterparts were by nature intercultural. However,
some of them were of particular interest for the sharp contrast
that they presented in cultural values and political ideology. As
his Japanese skills improved, he was probably able to converse on
more complex topics.
On February 1 Rezanov reported a very meaningful conversation
with Shozaemon about some of the cultural differences between
Japanese and Europeans. Rezanov tried to persuade Shozaemon to
incline the shogunate to act more humanely toward foreigners. He
expressed surprise that they dealt with the Russians in such a
way and do not ameliorate their harsh confinement. To this
Shozaemon replied with a smile “What confinement? It’s only a
ritual” “What do you mean--ritual? It’s involuntary and very
cruel,” countered Rezanov.
“Involuntary, to sit only for a while, while we are deprived of
freedom for a whole century, and don’t get bored. By the way, I
will add that we waited for you for twelve years and didn’t get
bored. So what does it cost you to show a little patience?”
Rezanov then told him that the Russians wanted at least as
much freedom as the Dutch. Shozaemon answered that they
waited seven years before they were granted this kindness by the
shogun. Rezanov thanked him sarcastically and said he would

prefer to return to Russia. Shozaemon said that he was free to
return whenever he wished, but that the magistrate would have
to first issue a permit to leave the port, and that there would
likely be serious obstacles. So, in fact, Rezanov was not ‘free’ to go
in the Western understanding of that term. This was an essential
point of difference which separated the two sides.
Shozaemon confessed that he was perhaps incautious in what
he said, but that this was useful to Rezanov and that he would
one day give his sincerity its just due. He wanted to counsel him
that only by patience would he win. Rezanov thanked him for his
advice, and said that some portion of patience remained to him,
but given his worsening condition of health he wondered if he
could imagine how much his expended patience had cost him.
Shozaemon greatly sympathized with his position and regretted
that Japanese laws are such that no Europeans like them.
Rezanov was dissatisfied nevertheless with his reply, but took his
leave of him as well as he could, and they finally parted as
friends..1
On April +- Tamehachiro promised to bring Rezanov a jibiki
even though it is potentially a capital crime to do so. He must
rely on his discretion. Rezanov told him that perhaps the time had
come to rid themselves of their ‘empty fears.’ The latter laughed
but told him that he was afraid to talk with him. “Do not be
afraid,” Rezanov told him, “the Russians will show you the path to
happiness” italics added
One wonders exactly what Rezanov could have meant by this
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statement. Was he suggesting that the Russian emperor might
send an even larger embassy that would compel the shogunate to
open its ports to Russian influence? Was he recommending a
Russian type of autocratic government for Japan?It is interesting
to speculate, but impossible to know exactly what he meant.
However, it seems certain that he thought that Russia could fulfill
the role of ‘teacher’ to the Japanese, not only for certain technical
skills, but in the larger sense of pointing out the way to a happier
and more fulfilling life. In fact, Russia would in later years fulfill
the role of ‘teacher’ to the Japanese in shipbuilding skills, among
other areas.
Clash of Ideologies : the domestic impact of the Rezanov embassy
At the most fundamental level, the more than six-month
encounter between Russians and Japanese in Nagasaki in +2*./
represented a profound clash of civilizations and their contrasting
values. The dominant neo-Confucian philosophy with its emphasis
on the performance of rites and rituals in recognition of a vertical
hierarchy of greater and lesser men, which formed the ideological
underpinnings of the shogunate, was challenged by the belief in
the worth and dignity of each individual human being and the
equality between human beings that was inspired by the writers
of the recent European Enlightenment and the slogans of the
French revolution. The clash of these opposing values can be seen
repeatedly in the conversations between Rezanov and his officers
with the Japanese officials with whom they had almost daily

contact in Nagasaki over the entire period of their stay there.
The Rezanov embassy suddenly presented a still feudalistic and
Confucianist Japan with the modern Western model of
international relations between different sovereign and equal
states. That the Japanese political elite was not able to suddenly
embrace this new revolutionary model, abandoning the traditional
one, should come as no surprise to anyone conscious of the
generally reactionary role of vested interests in any society. As
we have seen, when the opinion of the imperial court in Kyoto
was sought, its opposition allegedly turned the balance of opinion
against Rezanov. In effect, the Russian embassy had provoked a
sort of ‘constitutional crisis’ wherein the proclaimed ‘ancestral
laws’ substituted for the lack of a formal constitution, and
demanded to be upheld in the same way. To initiate Western-style
diplomatic and commercial relations with Russia, would have
necessitated the violation of those same ancestral laws, which
took the place of a formal constitution. This was also the opinion
of Hendrik Doeff, as quoted below, who spent almost two decades
in Japan, the longest tenure by far of any Dutch opperhoofd on
Dejima.
The shogunate justly feared the potential affect on the country
and its own claim to legitimacy, if Japanese ports other than
Nagasaki were opened to foreign ships, besides those of Holland.
They justly felt that it would bring about changes that would
lead to the demise of Tokugawa governance. Indeed, when the
shogunate did finally reluctantly agree to fully join the Western
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treaty system, in +2/2, it would last only ten more years. That is
why Okuma could assert with reason that the ultimate necessity
of opening the country to full diplomatic and commercial
relations with the advanced Western nations was first
demonstrated to a significant portion of Japan’s intellectual elite
by the Rezanov embassy. That such an opening took fifty and
more years to accomplish should come as no surprise, given the
radical revolution in cultural attitudes towards foreign
intercourse required, as outlined by Gibney +32/, against the
background of profound conservatism and intense patriotism of
the great majority of Japanese intellectuals of the day.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that there were
undoubtedly many who were genuinely in favor of trading with
the Russians. These included the magistrates, higher and lower
officials, interpreters, merchants and other inhabitants of
Nagasaki, as well as those of other cities, who stood to benefit
from trade with Russia. Because of the Napoleonic wars in
Europe, the Dutch had been unable to send any trading ships to
Japan for several years, which meant a great financial loss to the
citizens of Nagasaki. Thinking that trade with Russia could have
made up for that lack, it is little wonder why the great majority
of inhabitants of Nagasaki would have been disappointed and
dissatisfied with the shogunate’s decision to completely reject the
Rezanov embassy.
Seen in a larger context, contact with Russia in the late +2th to
early +3 th centuries was undoubtedly instrumental in making

Japanese leaders aware that their country’s long isolation might
soon be ended. However, the Russian proposal to establish
diplomatic relations in +2*. came fifty years too early. The
linguistic and cultural, ideological and political barriers proved to
be insurmountable. If Rezanov had been willing to act humbly
and obediently like the Dutch traders on Dejima had been doing
for almost ,** years, Russian ships might have been permitted to
share or supplement the Dutch trade, with the essential
cooperation of Doeff and the Dutch interpreters. However,
Rezanov’s emphasis on his high diplomatic status as courtier and
personal ambassador of the Russian emperor, rather than on his
position as head of the Russian-American company, made such an
arrangement impossible, as he himself told the interpreter
Shozaemon. It also probably doomed his mission from the
beginning. For in order for the shogunate to initiate diplomatic
relations with a foreign empire, it would have had to violate its
own laws that prohibit Japanese from travelling abroad. It would
have also had to reverse the dominant trend toward sakoku first
pronounced by Sadanobu in reply to Laxman.
While both the unofficial mission of Laxman and the official
embassy of Rezanov failed to achieve their commercial and
diplomatic aims, they did succeed, albeit unintentionally, in
shaping the determinedly isolationist foreign policy of the
shogunate for the next half century. As a result, all subsequent
Western expeditions to Japan were subjected to the same
exclusionary foreign policy that the mission of Laxman had
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forced the shogunal leaders to enunciate, and the embassy of
Rezanov had compelled them to make even more explicit.
This policy was again spelled out to Golovnin and Rikord when
the former was finally released from his two-year captivity in
+2+-. After the peaceful resolution of that incident, Russia would
have no further official contacts with Japan for forty years.
British whalers appearing off the coasts of Japan, and sometimes
making illegal landings, then became the primary foreign
nuisance and threat to Japanese isolation in the +2+*s and +2,*s. It
was their activities which prompted the bakufu to take the
extreme measure of issuing its expulsion edict in +2,/. This was
the most extreme development of the policy of sakoku, in which
the bakufu committed itself to a policy of indiscriminately firing
upon and driving off any foreign ships that approached Japanese
ports besides Nagasaki.
However, this order was rescinded in +2., in the wake of the
Opium war, and thenceforth the policy reverted to the former one
of offering foreign ships fuel and provisions, and then requesting
that they depart Japanese shores. With the arrival of powerful
steam-driven naval squadrons from America, Russia, Britain and
the Netherlands beginning in +2/-, coupled with their insistent
demands to open ports, the traditional policy of sakoku became
untenable, and a consensus toward kaikoku gradually emerged
among the Japanese political and intellectual elite.

Clash of Civilizations : The Impact on the Western Image of
Japan and of the Dutch on Dejima
While the shogunate wished to maintain the carefully designed
social order on which its legitimacy and stability rested, the
outside world, in particular, the Western world, was undergoing
rapid changes in almost all aspects of life. Despite these
far-reaching changes, the shogun’s representatives in Nagasaki
attempted to induce the Russians to follow the example of the
Dutch traders on Dejima, who in their old-fashioned dress and
quaint, humble manners seemed to represent a bygone era in
Europe. Needless to say, the Russians refused to imitate the Dutch
and greatly resented any attempts on the part of the Japanese to
force them to do so. Post-Enlightenment educated Europeans had
been inculcated with the ideas of individual worth and dignity
and so would not abase themselves before other men. Indeed,
Rezanov wrote that he did not even bow to God, except in his
own mind.
By the beginning of the +3th century, Westerners had become
more culturally assertive as the knowledge of nature gained
through scientific investigation bestowed power over nature and
over other nations. The industrial and scientific revolutions had
reinforced the conviction by many Westerners of their cultural
superiority, whose reverse side was a disdain for the customs of
non-Western nations. This in turn made it difficult to comply
with foreign customs that seemed to compromise their own
culturally-engrained sense of dignity and self-worth.
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At the same time the philosophical movement in Japan known
as kokugaku, which instilled in its adherents a conviction of the
innate superiority of Japanese culture relative to all others, was
becoming more influential. As a result, the perceived threat from
a Christian West was seen to endanger Japan at a more elemental
spiritual level, as well, and the necessity to prevent its influence
from entering the country became even more imperative. This
development set the stage for an ideological face-off between
Japan and the West, each claiming cultural and ethnic superiority
for themselves..2
As we have seen, both Western and Japanese scholars of the
Rezanov embassy have indicated its domestic impact on shogunal
foreign policy, and in particular how it served to elucidate and
consolidate the shogunal policy of sakoku. However, no scholar of
this embassy to my knowledge, whether Western or Japanese, has
yet drawn attention to the great impact that the descriptive
accounts of this embassy had on the formation of Western, in
particular Anglo-American, views of it. I have in mind specifically
the aforementioned accounts of Krusenstern and Langsdorff
published in English translations in London in +2+- and +2+1,
respectively, which were widely read, and served to form a very
negative impression of Japanese political culture in general, and
in particular of the seemingly shameful, and slavish obedience
shown by their fellow ‘enlightened’ Europeans, the Dutch, in the
performance of ‘humiliating’ rituals to lowly officials in Nagasaki.
This was the kind of impression that reinforced by subsequent

sensational stories would fuel resentment, breed indignation and
gradually ‘agitate’ the Western world, in the same sense of the
word as used by Okuma, until the American and Russian
governments were eventually moved to send new naval
expeditions and diplomatic missions to Japan in +2/,.
The Dutch had already long been the objects of ridicule for
their supposed denial of their Christian faith and ritualistic
‘trampling on the cross.’ In his satirical Gulliver’s Travels +1,0
Jonathan Swift sent his eponymous hero to Japan, the only real
country among the fantastic nations of Lilliput, Brobdingnag and
others, where he claimed to be a Dutch merchant and asked to be
transported to Nangasac Nagasaki. His request to be excused,
however, from the obligatory ritual of ‘trampling upon the
Crucifix’ elicited real surprise from the ‘emperor’ as he was the
first Dutchman ‘Who ever made any Scruple in this Point.’
Nevertheless, he granted his request but warned him to act as
though he had merely forgotten to do so, for if the Dutch learned
that he had been excused from doing it they would cut his throat.
This may be rich satire, but it is poor history. In fact, the Dutch
were never themselves required to ‘trample on the crucifix’ as the
Japanese residents of Nagasaki were. Perhaps this is but literary
revenge for the reputation they enjoyed among the English as
‘cut-throat’ businessmen..3
Now in post-Enlightenment Europe they were derided as
overtly secular, avaricious traders servilely sacrificing their
individual worth and dignity to an Oriental despotism for the
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sake of commercial gain. This negative view was voiced by the
influential Quarterly Review in +2+2 commenting on the recent
visit of the British ship The Brothers Capt. Gordon to Japan
Uraga and remarking that the “Dutchmen on Dejima are not
the best specimens of Christian Europe.” This comment was made
in the wake of the publication of Krusenstern’s and Langsdorff’s
accounts in English translations in London. It is very likely that
the author of these comments had read, or at least heard about
the passages in those two books relating to the stay of the
Russian embassy in Nagasaki and the allegedly ‘humiliating’
conditions the Dutch residing there were subjected to.
From this time on the reputation of the Dutch plummeted even
more, along with the notoriety of the port of Nagasaki, where
Europeans were supposedly subjected to ‘cruel commands’ and
‘ridiculous demands,’ incarcerated as virtual ‘state prisoners’ and
in the case of Rezanov compelled to wait several months in that
demeaning condition, only to be refused any trading privileges,
prohibited from any further contacts, and ignominiously sent
away. It was this very negative image of Japan’s only ‘open’ port,
however distorted or exaggerated, which would dominate the
perceptions of Europeans and Americans for the next fifty years
and help to instill a much more militant, intolerant and impatient
approach to the larger question of opening Japanese ports to
Western ships and trade.
Along with the need to open those ports, was the strong desire
to end the ‘unfair’ Dutch monopoly on trade with Japan, and at

the same time establish a new Western presence in Japan that
was emphatically not modelled on the unquestioning obedience to
the Japanese shogun of the +1th century VOC.
The accounts of Commodore Perry, Admiral Putiatin and the
officers and sailors who accompanied them to Japan in +2/- and
+2/. are remarkable for the number of references to the previous
embassy of Rezanov, as well as to the subsequent Russian raids
on Japanese settlements in the Kurils and Sahalin, and the
two-year captivity of Golovnin and several other Russians, both
of which had their origins in the failure of that embassy to
establish regular and formal relations with Japan. Golovnin’s
famous narrative of his captivity appeared in English translation
in London in +2+2, and served to further disseminate and reinforce
an unfavorable image of the Japanese as cruel captors and
torturers of Europeans. This was despite the fact that Golovnin’s
account itself was overall very balanced, detailing the many
instances of kindness and solicitousness shown to him and his
compatriots by both higher and lower officials, soldiers and
commoners alike.
In short, the Rezanov embassy, and its related incidents as
mentioned above, acted as an essential point of reference by
which to determine one’s own approach, and judge its degree of
success, for the American and Russian naval expeditions which
appeared in Japanese ports a half-century later. His knowledge of
the long confinement which Rezanov had to endure, as well as the
‘humiliating’ incarceration on Dejima and the ‘demeaning’ rituals
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that the Dutch in Nagasaki were made to perform, is undoubtedly
a major reason why Perry absolutely refused to go to Nagasaki.
Putiatin also did not want to go there for those reasons, and but
for last-minute supplementary orders from the Russian
government, would have taken his squadron to Uraga, as Perry
did. During the negotiations about the protocol to be followed for
his first visit to the Nagasaki magistrate’s office, Putiatin rebuffed
the attempt by the Japanese to use the Rezanov embassy as a
precedent. However, in general, Putiatin adopted Rezanov’s
principle of following Japanese customs insofar as that was
consistent with the maintenance of his own dignity, as defined by
Russian customs.
In terms of the topics for discussion and negotiation between
the Japanese diplomats and their Western counterparts, virtually
all the issues that brought Perry and Putiatin to Japan were first
brought up, and discussed between Rezanov and the Japanese
interpreters of Dutch and the banyoshi in Nagasaki. As examples
of this, one could cite articles of trade, samples of manufactured
items and the humane treatment of victims of shipwreck. The
topic of coal for steamships would be one outstanding exception.
In addition, Perry and Putiatin were also very insistent that their
high naval rank and status as plenipotentiary emissaries of their
respective governments be recognized and went ashore with all
due pomp and ceremony. However, neither showed much interest
in learning Japanese, and little appreciation of Japanese culture,
other than in acquiring lacquerware and other souvenirs. In short,

Rezanov was both a model and anti-model for both Perry and
Putiatin fifty years later.
Critiques of the Rezanov Embassy : Some Contemporary Voices
On the Japanese side, voices were raised both for and against
the decision by the government in Edo to rebuff Rezanov. The
artist Shiba Kokan criticized the shogunate for keeping the
Russian envoy waiting for six months in Nagasaki, and treating
him very discourteously and even inhumanely. He argued in
favor of trade with Russia, given that rice was both cheap and
abundant in Japan. Selling this surplus grain to the Russians
would raise its price and thereby benefit the samurai class, and
also provide funds to develop Ezo.
The explorer of the northern frontiers of Japan, Mogami
Tokunai, on hearing of rejection of Russian embassy, wrote that
people all over the country sympathized with the Russians. This
is similar to what the Nagasaki interpreters told Rezanov
repeatedly at the end of his stay there.
Though he actually dreaded foreign intercourse, Aoki Okikatsu,
acknowledged as “the grandfather of Dutch studies rangaku in
the Chikuzen fief,” felt that Rezanov should not be turned down
flatly, but that a promise of trade fifty years hence should be held
out to him, a suggestion almost prophetic in calculation, since
Japan’s first treaty with a Western power was to be signed in
+2/.. From the above, it may be easy to form the misleading
impression that the number of Japanese intellectuals protesting
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against the Russians’ rejection were greater. But Kisaki claims
that the voices in support of the decision were actually more
numerous./*
In any case, Rezanov would certainly have laughed at Aoki’s
proposal in +2*/. In fact, no European emissary would have been
satisfied with an offer of trade in /* years. It would have seemed
far more like a ‘No’ than even remotely like a ‘Yes.’ That Aoki was
not alone in holding these views is borne out by the fact that a
policy of deliberate delay was what emerged among shogunal
ruling circles after the arrival of Perry and Putiatin in +2/-. Only
by then, the promise of ‘fifty’ years had been reduced to ‘five’
years, a much more reasonable and acceptable figure.
Conclusion : Some important remaining questions
+ Could Rezanov, on any other ambassador, have succeeded?
There are two ways of looking at this question--either the
Rezanov embassy failed because it had not come earlier, when the
pro-Russia party was predominant, or it failed because it had
come much too early. The Japanese interpreters of Dutch in their
intimate conversations with Rezanov stressed the former reason,
but Doeff laid emphasis on the the latter. My personal view on
this question is very close to that of the Dutch factor. Like him, I
believe that even if some of the shogunal leadership, including the
shogun himself, were in favor of dealing with the Russians, by
that time the influence of the ideology of ‘national learning’

kokugaku had grown to such an extent that the authority of the
shogunate to decide such vital questions was being seriously
undermined. This meant that those who questioned the
legitimacy of the shogunate and its right to rule would have
insisted on consulting the imperial court in Kyoto, who, in this
case, probably welcomed the opportunity for domestic political
reasons, to oppose any departure from the supposed ‘ancestral
laws’ governing Japan’s exclusionism. As mentioned above, these
were the informal equivalent of a national constitution, which, of
course, no nation could be expected to overturn before the most
serious deliberations had been devoted to the question. That is in
essence why Rezanov was kept waiting for so long, while a sort of
‘constitutional crisis’ was occuring. Rezanov and his compatriots
had entered a very different world from Europe, where diplomatic
and commercial ‘friendly’ relations between different sovereign
states were taken fully for granted. In Japan, what was taken for
granted was just the opposite idea : that no true friendship
between nations of unequal size and strength and contrastive
customs was possible. Therefore, it was better not to have
relations of any kind, unless like the Dutch and Chinese traders in
Nagasaki, they could be treated as vassals and all their actions
fully regulated and controlled by the shogunal agents there.
Interpreted in this way, it is easy to see why Okuma had been
moved to make such a judgement on the significance of the
Rezanov embassy. It was the first full-scale attempt to induce
Japan to abandon its ‘ancestral laws’ serving as a de facto
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Constitution in order to join the Western diplomatic and
commercial system. That the embassy failed should be ascribed
much more to the near impossibility of the task than to
ambassador Rezanov’s shortcomings as a leader and negotiator.
That his was truly a ‘mission impossible’ is supported by the fact
that what he sought to obtain would not be achieved until the
West was in a position to project much greater military and
political power in far east Asia. The conclusion of the commercial
treaties with the five major Western powers in +2/2 and the
opening of official diplomatic and commercial relations the
following year were only achieved in that historical context.
In fact, Rezanov’s exalted rank and insistence on respect in
accord with it, and desire for diplomatic relations with Tokugawa
Japan made approval of trade along the lines of that already
established by the Dutch to be so much more difficult. The
Russian emperor Alexander I had invested his personal prestige
in the embassy and its success. As the ambassador and personal
representative of his beloved sovereign, Rezanov was acutely
sensitive to any slights or indignities he felt were directed
towards him. This keen awareness of his exalted status as the
personal emissary of the Russian emperor must have rendered it
all but impossible for Rezanov to willingly conform to Tokugawa
cultural norms and forms of etiquette like the Dutch traders on
Dejima, setting aside European cultural norms and attitudes. If he
had been so able to, the Russian-American company might have
been given a share of the Dutch trade, or even permitted to trade

on its own. The key requirement would have been to fit into the
Tokugawa social order, like the Dutch. The Dutch were of course
foreigners, but they were also an integral part of the Tokugawa
political system, which lent prestige to the shogun and the entire
Tokugawa ruling apparatus.
, Can the Dutch be blamed for sabotaging the Russian mission?
Attributing the failure of the Rezanov embassy to Dutch
intrigues behind the scenes has been a very common theme
among Western writers since Hawks +2/0. Both Krusenstern
and Langsdorff are reported to have favored that interpretation.
It seems to have been given documentary evidence in the form of
a letter written by the Dutch factor to his superiors in Batavia,
which was intercepted by the British. In it Doeff was alleged to
have boasted of having dissuaded the Japanese from agreeing to
deal with Rezanov. However, Doeff claims that he only reported
this fact, taking no credit for himself. Almost one hundred years
later, Harrison +3/- alleged in reference to Rezanov : “He did
not know that the Dutch were making every effort to block the
success of his mission.”/+However, he offers no concrete reference
and no credible evidence for such an assertion. Furthermore, it is
flatly contradicted by ample and convincing testimony by the
Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch, as well as Doeff and Rezanov
themselves. To his credit, Lensen +3/3 offers this explanation
as only one among competing alternatives. More recently the
Russo-Japanese historian Togawa Tsuguo has argued that this
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traditional interpretation needs to be reexamined. /, This is an
opinion that I emphatically concur with.
From Rezanov’s diary we learn that Rezanov was himself quite
satisfied that his rejection owed nothing to Dutch intrigues
behind the scenes. On the contrary, he considered them his
staunch allies. He does not go into the specific details about why
he thought so, but he does mention that he continued a secret
correspondence with Doeff in French throughout his stay there
with the connivance of the Japanese interpreters. We do not know
what the content of this correspondence was except for two
phrases that Doeff himself revealed, as quoted below.
We also know from his diary that Rezanov had wanted to meet
with Doeff again on the day of his departure from his residence at
Umegasaki, but that he was denied permission to do so. Doeff also
must have had a cordial regard for the Russian ambassador, given
his solicitous attention to him during his entire stay.
As for Doeff’s stance toward the Russian mission, I consider
what he later wrote in his book to be a sincere statement. His
arguments seem logical and convincing to me. In contrast,
although I have often read about how he allegedly sabotaged the
Russian mission, I have never seen any concrete evidence of
Doeff’s intrigues against the Russians. As he himself said, it might
well have had the opposite effect.
As mentioned previously, the three senior interpreters assured
Rezanov April 2 that the Dutch were favorably inclined to
Russia. They also maintained that the Dutch had no influence on

government affairs.
Rezanov sent his thanks for the presents to the Dutch factor
Doeff via Sukezaemon and asked him to assure him that he did
not in the least suspect the Hollanders, and knows that there is
not the least benefit for them in damaging the Russians’
interests./-
Although Doeff denied that he played any role in it, the
complete rejection of the Russian proposals that occured at the
audience on April / came as no surprise to him.
The refusal to negotiate with the embassy and to enter into
a close relations with Russia, was foreseen by all who had
any knowledge of Japan. The laws, customs and mores of
this people do not allow to enter into ties of friendship and
trade with other nations...as became clear from the reply of
the court. Until the fundamental laws of the state, by which
Japan has fared so well for two centuries, are repealed, all
such proposals from any nation will receive a negative
reply.
If we Dutchmen were not settled there already, we would
never be allowed in, and if we were not protected by the
permit of the great Gongen, the author of the basic law
constitution now in effect, they would have surely got
rid of us a long time ago.
Doeff could not presume that the Japanese were allowing the
Dutch traders to remain in Japan on account of the profits they
brought to the shogunate. He thought that the Dutch trade was
From Russia with All Due Respect : Revisiting the Rezanov Embassy to Japan 
only advantageous to the magistrates and inhabitants of
Nagasaki. Moreover, he felt that Japan had no real need for
foreign imports, whether of foodstuffs, or metals, or cotton cloth,
or of the luxury goods and other trifles the Dutch brought them.
Because of the closure of the country to all but a few foreigners,
and the prohibition against Japanese leaving it, the Japanese did
not consider objects of luxury to be necessities, and so did not feel
the lack of them. Thus, he felt that the assertion in the letter to
Rezanov that Japan could easily do without foreign trade was
reasonable. Having lived in Japan for almost nineteen years, Doeff
was thoroughly convinced that this was true.
Doeff took upon himself to answer other accusations made
against him in the travel accounts of Langsdorff and Krusenstern
that were widely read in Europe. “...can the failure of the Russian
embassy which became known in Europe through travel accounts
of Langsdorff and Krusenstern justifiably be ascribed to the
Dutch and especially to me.? One has to acknowledge that it
would be ridiculous for me to take steps with the Japanese
government to prevent the granting of access to the Russians
because I knew and had seen the year before that the laws of the
empire prohibit trade with foreigners, as one sees affirmed yet
again in Golovnin’s adventures.”/.
Doeff saw no reason to assume that the Edo government would
grant trading privileges to the Russians in +2*., having denied
them to the enigmatic Captain Stewart in +2*-, as such privileges
would contradict the basic law of the empire. Doeff argued

cogently that even if he had actively opposed the Russian petition
for trade, the shogunal leaders would not have paid any attention
to his views, if they had seen it to be in the interest of the
country to depart from the ancestral laws and establish trade
relations with Russia. For that reason, he stated that he did not
involve himself in this case either in writing or orally and
maintained complete silence on the issue. “For I surely knew that
even the granting of access to Russia could not have harmed the
Dutch interests, with whom the Japanese have lived in friendship
for two centuries.” He does not elaborate on this point, yet it is
curious that so many other Western writers seem to assume just
the opposite : that any trading privileges granted to Russia would
naturally be to the disadvantage of the Dutch. This may have
been true in a previous era, but at that time, when there were
very few Dutch ships available to carry cargo to Japan, the
participation of Russian ships could have been distinctly to their
advantage, just as American and other ships were being used in
that way.
As for the less than optimal accommodation offered to Rezanov,
and the long delay in dispatching an envoy from Edo with the
reply to his proposals, Doeff commented that“...it is clear that the
refusal of Mr. Rezanov to adapt to Japanese customs as well as to
hand over the muskets, can have been a reason for the delay in
permission for the embassy to go ashore, as well as of the strange
and unsuitable residence that they were given.” As for the
rejection of his proposals, Doeff nevertheless concluded that even
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if “he would have submitted humbly in a reasonable way, he
would still have failed to achieve the main objective of his trip.”//
Doeff attested to the fact that “The ambassador Rezanov was
engaged in a very amicable correspondence with me. And on a
certain occasion, when I had sent a present to his excellency, he
thanked me in the name of all the Russians with these words :
“Upon my return to Europe, I will not fail to recommend you to
my august Master.” This surely indicates that Rezanov was very
favorably inclined toward him.
Rezanov later wrote a note to Doeff which seemed to
completely exonerate him from any suspicion of intrigues against
the Russians. “Although things turned out badly, nothing can be
attributed to our Batavian Dutch allies.” Doeff felt that he had
written these words in all sincerity.
Indeed, unless Doeff was so cleverly manipulating things behind
the scenes that Rezanov had no inkling of it, he could not have
uttered these words. Of course, there is no independent
confirmation that he said them, but the consistently cordial
attitude toward Doeff evident from his journal, certainly lends the
ring of truth to them. Furthermore, given Rezanov’s apparently
intimate relations with the Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch, it is
highly unlikely that none of them would have breathed a word
about Doeff’s intrigues against him, if he was in fact so inclined.
While preparing to leave, Rezanov desired to pay a farewell
visit to Doeff on Dejima, but even this reasonable request was
denied, as was that of Doeff to visit him at Umegasaki. The Dutch

raised a flag on their balcony, and they and the Russians had to
content themselves with greeting each other from a distance.
When Rezanov and his entourage passed by Dejima on board of
the barge belonging to the daimyo of Chikugo, “The Russians
gave us unambiguous signs of satisfaction and friendship with
us,” Doeff later fondly recalled./0
- What is the legacy of the Rezanov embassy to Nagasaki?
While the West was preparing to accelerate in the direction of
ever-wider commercial and political intercourse under the
newly-harnessed power of steam-driven machines, the shogunate
was determinedly attempting to pull a changing Japan in the
opposite direction, towards greater isolation and insulation from
further social change. Eventually these two tendencies would
come up against each in a test of strength and wills, as in the
proverbial encounter of irresistible force against immovable
object. Although the ambitious aims of the Rezanov embassy
were premature by half a century, it helped to accelerate
intellectual currents and cultural and political forces both in and
outside Japan that would eventually render that object more
movable than it appeared to be at first glance and from a
distance.
In addition, when one takes into account the fifty odd years
from the arrival of the Russian naval squadron under Admiral
Putiatin in +2/- up until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war
in +3*., one is even less able to dismiss the Rezanov embassy as a
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total failure, and to belittle, as Krusentern did, the declarations of
affection and friendship made repeatedly to Rezanov by the
Nagasaki interpreters and other officials during his prolonged
stay in Nagasaki. Even the war did not put an end to the mutual
affection and respect shared between Russians and Japanese in
Nagasaki on a personal level. Postcards depicting Rezanov in his
full-dress uniform with his ribband across his chest and wearing a
large hat, modern variants of the prints that his guards told him
about, are still popular souvenir items in Nagasaki, and elsewhere
in Japan. To this day, his portrait and a sketch of the Russian
ship are kept under glass in the archives of the Nagasaki Museum
of History and Culture.
The leaders of the shogunate in Edo and the court in Kyoto
who opposed establishing commercial relations with Russia may
have thought that the rejection of the Rezanov embassy was the
end of the matter. If so, they were mistaken. It was actually only
the beginning of a long, stormy, on-again, off-again, love-hate
relationship, combining attraction and fear, admiration and
derision to varying degrees over different periods that would
continue up to the present day. The Laxman mission personally
introduced Russia and Russians to Japan and laid a basis for
future friendship ; the Rezanov embassy brought the first large
party of Russians to Nagasaki, the epicenter of Japanese foreign
relations at that time, and made an indelible and lasting
impression. It sowed the seeds of a special relationship of friendly
intimacy and mutual respect that would blossom a half century

later. Although Rezanov had failed in his primary aim to initiate
trade relations with Japan, he had succeeded in several other
important aspects, whether intentionally or not. Although
Rezanov, and the other leaders of the expedition, still did not fully
understand Japan, and its strange customs and laws, they had
engaged in many dialogs with their Japanese counterparts which
put them on the path toward a better mutual comprehension. At
the very least, and without the slightest doubt, it can be said that
after the Rezanov embassy, Russians and Japanese were no longer
strangers to each other. Indeed, even after the Nadyezhda had
sailed out to sea, fond memories of the Russians and other
Europeans would have been likely to linger in the hearts and
minds of many of those who dealt with them in Nagasaki for
months and years to come. In many cases, these memories would
be passed on to their descendants, such that in later years
Russians and their ships would hear welcoming voices and be
offered a safe haven and a second home in the tranquil inlets and
verdant hills of Nagasaki.
Notes
+ The portion of the diary that dealt with the voyage before its arrival in Nagasaki
was published in serial form in Otiechestvennye zapiski +2,,,/.
, It is believed that the Tsarist censors suppressed it because of the light it shed on
the reasons for the failure of the embassy. Ito Hidemasa believes that it was kept
from publication by the Soviet authorities until after the collapse of the Soviet
Union out of fear of its possible effect on the Russo-Japanese territorial problem. 
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   /3 p. -/
- The English version of Krusenstern’s book is often not a faithful rendering from the
original Russian. Some key words have clearly been mistranslated, and some
passages perhaps even altered to make them more critical of ambassador Rezanov,
and the Japanese interpreters. Therefore, the quotations in this article are my own
translation from the original Russian
. George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan, Princeton, +3/3, pp. +0*, ,/+
/ Francis Hawks, Introduction to Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron
to the China Seas and Japan..., Washington, D.C., +2/0, pp. ./0
0 Lensen, p. +0*
1 Fifty Years of New Japan Kaikoku gojunen shi, compiled by Count Shigenobu
Okuma, English version edited by Marcus B. Huish, Volume I, Second Edition, p. //
London, +3+* Kraus Reprint, New York, +31*
2 See my The Opening of Japan, +2/-+2// ,**0 for a full discussion of this question
of to whom should belong the credit for the ‘opening of Japan.’
3 Martin Ramming, “U»ber den Anteil der Russen an der Ero¨ffnung Japans fu¨r den
Verkehr mit den Westlichen Ma¨chten,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu¨r
Natur- und Vo¨lkerkunde Ostasiens, Band XXI, Teil B., p. B++ Tokyo, +3,0
+* John A. Harrison, Japan’s Northern Frontier, p. ,- Gainesville, +3/- He noted that
Okuma’s speech was mentioned in the Japan Times, June ,*, +3+0. However, my
investigation has revealed that the actual date is July ,*. Unfortunately, on that date
Okuma’s speech was not quoted from directly. Yet judging by the editorial
comments, it seems that some sort of controversial remarks were made.
++ Lensen, p. +0+
+, James Murdoch, A History of Japan, Vol III, The Tokugawa Epoch, +0/,+202,
London, +3,0.
+- W. G. Beasley, Introduction to Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, +2/-+202,
Oxford, +3// p. . ; G. B. Sansom, A History of Japan +0+/+201, Stanford, +30-, pp.
,*,-
+. Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, Berkeley, +33-, pp. .2122 ; Monumenta
Nipponica, p. /

+/  	
 Tokyo, +321, p. 3
+0   Tokyo, +330, p.
+1  !" #$%" +2*.+2*/ ,***, p. +,
+2 Mitani Hiroshi, translated by David Noble, Escape From Impasse : the Decision to
Open Japan, Tokyo, ,**0, pp. +-+.. This book is a translation of his &'()*
Tokyo, ,**-
+3 Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, Princeton, +32/, pp. +,
+.
,* Lensen, pp. +,02, +-,0
,+ Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, Komandor Krasnoyarsk, +33/ p. +,,
,, Rezanov, p. +,-
,- Ivan Fyodorovich Krusenstern, in Otiechestvu poleznym byt’ : pervye russkie
krugosvetnye plavaniia Vladivostok, +321, p. +*1
,. G. F. Von Langsdorff, A Voyage Around the World, London, +2+-, pp. ,,01
,/ Rezanov, pp. +,./
,0 Langsdorff, p. ,,2 ; Rezanov, pp. +,/+,1
,1 Langsdorff, Ibid., pp. ,-+-- This book contains an illustration wherein Japanese
officials are depicted in the same posture as the Dutch were required to assume, with
their body bent at the waist, forming a right angle to the ground.
,2 Krusenstern, pp. +*12, ++*
,3 Krusenstern, p. +*2
-* Hendrik Doeff, Herinneringen, uit Japan Haarlem, +2-- pp. 223+. Doeff’s rebuttal
of the criticisms directed against him have received little attention in the
English-speaking world. One reason for this neglect could be connected with the fact
that a complete English translation of this book did not appear in print until ,**-.
-+ Rezanov, pp. +,2-* ; Langsdorff, pp. ,-1-2
-, Langsdorff, pp. ,.+, ,.-
-- Rezanov, pp. +-01, +-3
-. Langsdorff, pp. ,.01
-/ Rezanov, p. +.2 ; Langsdorff, pp. ,0,-
-0 Rezanov, p. +1* ; Langsdorff, p. ,20
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.+ Rezanov, pp. ,,/2
., Rezanov, pp. ,-,--
.- Rezanov, pp. ,-02
.. Langsdorff, p. ,-/
./ Rezanov, p. +1/ Neither of these first two balloon launches were reported in
Langsdorff’s account.
.0 Rezanov, p. +2/ ; Langsdorff, p. ,3-
.1 Rezanov, pp. +2/0
.2 Totman, Early Modern Japan, p. .2,
.3 William McOmie, Foreign Images and Experiences of Japan, +03*+2.+, Global
Oriental, Folkestone, Kent, UK, ,**/, p. /2
/* Kisaki, pp. ,-., ,-0 ; Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, Stanford, +303, pp.
/1, +-0 ; Lensen, pp. +2021
/+ Harrison, p. ,*
/, Lensen, pp. +0*, ,00 ;  	
 Unpublished manuscript in
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/- Rezanov, p. ,,2
/. Doeff, pp. +*/*2
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